NOTES AND COMMENTARY
IS

THE CURRENT

DISPOSITION OF THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN

THE UNITED STATES APPROPRIATE IN LIGHT OF PREVAILING GOVERNMENTAL

POLICY?

Present applications of the doctrine of sovereign immunity' in American
courts of law indicate that certain broad questions of a judicial policy nature are
present. Initially, the doctrine juxtaposes the idea that sovereign powers are to
be accorded international supremacy with the notion of individual justice-that
one who is injured by the acts of another should be permitted to present his
claim for redress in a public forum. Secondly, the immunity doctrine presents a
conflict between the executive and judicial branches of the government since the
granting or denying of immunity to a foreign sovereign has an impact upon the
proper conduct of United States foreign relations. Sovereign immunity has been
referred to as both a stumbling block in the path of good neighbor relations
between nations 2 and an impediment to the proper functioning of the judicial
process. Just as the political and economic status of the United States has
changed in the last two centuries, so has the judiciary's application of the
immunity doctrine. Nevertheless, some writers and jurists insist that alterations
in the doctrine have not been radical enough, and many would prefer to dispense
3
with sovereign immunity altogether.
The concept of sovereign immunity arose from the ancient notion that the
sovereign was infallible and that governmental authority ought to be exhalted to
the highest degree.' Historically, the attempt to grant to a foreign ruler less than
the fullest immunity from judicial process was deemed an affront to the
sovereignity of both the person and the state he ruled. Despite contemporary
recognition of the proposition that a government should be held responsible for
its acts, the doctrine of sovereign immunity continues to survive. However, the
exemption from judicial process has changed considerably with respect to what
may be termed its procedural and substantive aspects. In this country these
modifications may generally be traced to evolving policy ideas regarding the
rThis Note will primarily be confined to an examination of jurisdictional immunity, as opposed
to immunity from execution. For a discussion of immunity from execution, see note 141 infra.
'Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 194, 215 A.2d 864, 893
(1966) (Musmanflo, J., dissenting).
3E.g., Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRrr. Y.B.
INT'L L. 220, 224-26 (195 1).
'It was not until the nineteenth century that the doctrine was given judicial application:
The scantiness of pre-nineteenth-century judicial decisions bearing upon the exemption of
States from the jurisdiction of foreign courts serve as explanation of the absence of
reference to the subject in the classics of international law. Thus, to give examples,
Gentili, Grotius, Bynkershoek and Vattel did not refer to the doctrine of State immunity,
although the problems of diplomatic immunities and the immunities of personal
sovereigns were extensively discussed in their treatises.
S. SCHUARITKUL. STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING AcTivrnEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1959).
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United States and its role in international politics. Foreign policy necessarily
embraces a regard for prevailing international economic structures, 5 as well as
the conduct of diplomatic relations between states. Thus, .American foreign
policy has been, and continues to be, affected by the burgeoning of foreign
intercourse and the entry of the government into many areas once considered
solely within the private sector.
Present treatment of the doctrine involves consideration of both the
substantive and procedural aspects of the sovereign immunity claim. The
substantive aspect concerns whether immunity should be applied absolutely in
favor of all foreign sovereigns' or whether the privilege should be accorded only
in certain limited circumstances. The procedural aspect involves an examination
of the manner in which the claim is presented to the court. Further, if the
immunity request has proceeded through diplomatic channels, consideration
must be given to the weight to be accorded such executive department
suggestions. Currently a restrictive approach to sovereign immunity prevails
and executive requests for immunity are generally treated by the courts as being
conclusive.
The purpose of this note will be to examine whether the present application of
the doctrine in the United States warrants the critical comment it has received.
The approach will be to review the historical evolution of the doctrine in the
American politico-economic arena in order to determine whether its
contemporary substantive and procedural application is supported by existing
foreign policy structures. Such examination is appropriate since the execution
of foreign policy decisions are affected by application of the doctrine. Two eras
may be distinguished: 1775-1900, during which the traditional concept of
absolute immunity was formulated; and Twentieth Century practice, during
which judicial decisions have reflected the need to modify the traditional
approach to meet existing policy demands. Particular emphasis will be placed
upon recent case law and other evidence of contemporary application of the
doctrine.
'Setser. The Immunities of the State and Government Economic Activities. 24 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROR. 291, 292 (1959). Setser commented: "It seems that doubt about the means for settlement of
disputes is one of the minor factors, for example, that militates against improvement in the
commercial relations between the United States and the Soviet Union." Id.
'he traditional rule of absolute immunity was expressed in an 1880 British case:
[Als a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign authority, and of the
international comity which indures every sovereign state to respect the independence and
dignity of every other sovereign state, each and every one declines to exercise by means of
its Courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person of any sovereign or
ambassador of any other state, or over the public property of any-state which is destined
to public use. ...
The Parlement Beige, 5 P.D. 197, 214-15 (C.A. 1880).

1970]
1.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
PRE-TWENTIETH CENTURY PRACTICE-THE TRADITIONAL RULE

At the time of the American Revolution, there existed a nearly universal
principal which limited colonial trade to the mother country.! The colonial
struggle for independence resulted not only from conflicting political
philosophies, but also from the conflict between England's policy of
mercantilism' and the desire of northern colonial merchants to establish new
markets for their products.' Foreign trade continued throughout the war, but
after 1776 it experienced an unfortunate decline since the former mother country was reluctant to establish trade relationships with the new nation. However,
the ensuing conflict between England and France opened new foreign markets
for anxious American merchants.0 This new source of income permitted mer-

chants to increase their demand for trade related services such as financing,
insurance and brokerage." A further important consideration was the development of the corporation as a legal concept. The corporate form of business
made it easier for businessmen to finance the foreign trade commitments that
were so vital to an unstable domestic econony.'2 In light of this domestic instability and the subsequent desire for substantial foreign trade, much of which
would necessarily extend to foreign sovereigns and their agents, it is arguable
that a judicial decision holding the foreign sovereign accountable at law would
have done much harm by dissuading the sovereign from dealing with colonial
merchants.
It has been said that the United States was born out of a European balance of
power which prevented England from exerting her full might to crush the
colonies.1 Because most major American governmental policies were formed at
T

E. BORCHARD, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 16 (1946).
'The basic mercantilist notion was to send as many goods abroad as possible inexchange for as
few imports as possible. Mercantilism in practice involved the regulation of trade more drastically
than ever before; imports were reduced and European states even required that goods be transported
in vessels exclusively owned and operated by nationals of the state. A component in England's
policy of mercantilism was the establishment of colonies abroad which could supply necessary raw
materials to the mother country and accept her products in return. F. HARTMANN, THE RELATIONS
OF NATIONS 135 (1966).
'R. ROBERTSON, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 87 (1964). In his commentary Mr.

Robertson stated:
The events that led to the American Revolution fall into better order if we keep in mind
the central theme underlying them: Mercantilistpolicy, imposed on an essentially selfgoverning peoplefor a hundred andfifty years, led finally to a constitutionalconflict that
could be solved only on the battlefield. The revolutionary crisis was a political crisis, but
the stresses and strains that led to fear and hatred of the British had economic origins.
Id.
"Statistics reveal that the dollar value of imports and exports increased during this period as did
the tonnage of the merchant marine. Id. at 225.
"Id. at 235.
'"The United States' desire for increased foreign trade was a result of its domestic instability. The
classic model has been described: "'In
the traditional conception . . . [the domestic structure is
taken as given; foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends." Kissinger, Domestic Structure
and Foreign Policy. in INTERNATIONAL POLITCS AND FOREIGN POUCY 261 (J. Rosenau ed. 1969).
'F. HARTMANN, supra note 8, at 427-28.
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a time when extraordinary conditions prevailed in international relations, it was
difficult to readjust American political bases at a later date. Both Washington
and Jefferson cautioned against permitting the new republic to enter into
European power politics. 4 Thus, decisions which would ultimately have a great
impact upon foreign relations were often reached with some reluctance.
It was in this economic and political setting that the United States Supreme
Court grappled with the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The first American
case in which the issue was raised was United States v. Richard Peters (The

Cassius)."s There the owner of an American ship brought a libel alleging that a
French corvette, The Cassius, had pirated his ship on the high seas. The
Supreme Court subsequently declared the libelee's ship immune from suit in an
American court of law."4 A later suit against The Cassius, Ketland v. The
Cassius." marked the first use of a "suggestion"" issued to the judiciary by the
executive branch of the United States government in a manner similar to that
practiced today." After the suggestion of immunity was filed with the Court, the
suit was dismissed. It is important to note that at the time of this decision the
concept of sovereign immunity, while the subject of much discussion, was by no
means an established doctrine. It did not achieve the status of an accepted rule
of international law until well into the Nineteenth Century."m
"Id. at 428.
153U.S. (3 Dall.) 120 (1795).

"in the later case of The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), the

United States attorney for the district of Pennsylvania appeared and filed a "suggestion" in which
he discussed The Cassius:
The Cassius . . .had violated a municipal law of the United States; yet, being a public
vessel of France, the government of the United States directed the attorney general to file
a suggestion, stating the character of the vessel, which it was supposed would have taken
the case out of the jurisdiction of the court. But the case went off upon another objection

to the jurisdiction.
Id. at 124, 125.

'72 U.S. (2 Dail.) 365 (1796).
"In its broad sense, a "suggestion" refers to any statement which formally brings to the attention
of the court certain facts or circumstances necessary to the court's proper treatment of an issue. For
purpose of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a "suggestion" refers to any such statement,
presented to the court by various means, which comments upon the disposition of the immunity
claim.
"in the subsequent suit against the The Cassius for violation of neutrality laws prohibiting the
outfitting of foreign vessels in United States ports, the French government took the matter directly
to the executive branch; when the Attorney General filed a "suggestion" of immunity, the case was
dismissed. Ketland v. The Cassius, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 365, at 365 (1796). The practice soon developed of requesting the Attorney General to file a suggestion with the Court. See Feller,
Procedure in Cases Involving Immunity of Foreign States in Courts of the United States. 25 AM.
J. INT'L L.83, 86 (1931). See also the discussion of Exparte Muir in text following note 70 infra.
The Muir decision crystalized the procedure for presenting immunity suggestions to the court.
"English case law did not touch upon the question of sovereign immunity until 1820 in The Prins
Fredrik, 2 Dods. 451 (1820), and even then the issue was not decided. See Riesenfeld, Sovereign
Immunity of Foreign Vessels in Anglo-American Law: The Evolution of a Legal Doctrine, 25
MINN. L. REV. I, 8-9 (1940).

19701

SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY

In 1812 the case of The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon2 1 was decided by a
unanimous Supreme Court. This was the first important American case to
analyze and apply the rule of sovereign immunity, although the dispute involved
a warship rather than a merchant vessel. A libel was filed against The
Exchange, a French naval vessel, when it entered the port of Philadelphia to
make repairs. The libellants, claiming the ship had been seized on the high seas
by the French Navy and outfitted as a warship, sought to have possession of the
ship restored to them. The United States Attorney General, on behalf of the
State Department, filed a "suggestion" with the Court requesting that
jurisdiction be denied and the suit dismissed. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated
that the jurisdiction of a state, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive
and absolute, and that any limitation of the state's power in this regard must be
traced to the express or implied consent of that state.2 Marshall recognized the
necessity of political and economic intercourse between states when he referred
to the early nineteenth century world as being composed of distinct sovereignties "whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other, and by
an interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants
require."21
The Chief Justice further stated that there are three situations in which the
sovereign will be deemed to have waived a part of its exclusive territorial
jurisdiction. The third of such situations 2' was asserted to exist when a local
sovereign permits troops of a foreign sovereign to pass through its dominion. In
so doing, the local sovereign was said to have given his implied consent to vest
the visiting sovereign with immunity from jurisdiction. However, there would be
no presumption of immunity if no general or specific consent to pass had been
given, as by treaty or other agreement, or none could be implied from custom or
practice. In applying this third exception to the facts of the case, the Court
reasoned that if a port such as Philadelphia is open to ships of all nations, an
armed public vessel may enter and claim immuniy even though no express
consent is given with regard to either that particular vessel or sovereign. 2 The
Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court, holding that the libelee was
entitled to exemption from jurisdiction in American courts."' Thus it seemed
that the king could do wrong, but that he could not be held accountable in a
21 U.S. (7
2id. at 136.

Cranch) 116 (1812).
This "consent" notion was supported by the customs and practice of international

law.
nid.

wrhe other two exempt situations were: (I) "the exemption of the person of the sovereign from
arrest or detention within a foreign territory," and (2) "the immunity Which all civilized nations
allow to foreign ministers." Id. at 137-38.
nid. at 142.
uAlthough the case was an in rem proceeding against a public vessel, subsequent cases consider
this decision as having also extended immunity to in personam actions against a foreign sovereign.
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public forum. The Supreme Court noted, however, that in the case of private
individuals or commercial vessels a different result would attend:
[Wlhen merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual
infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants
did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the
jurisdiction of the country.27
There is no evidence in Marshall's opinion that he intended that immunity
2
attach to any commercial vessel, even those operated by a foreign sovereign.
However, at the time of tile Schooner Exchange decision, the real possibility of
governmental operation of commericial enterprise had not been contemplated.
The United States foreign policy and the international trade relationships
which existed at the time of the Schooner Exchange were to undergo a marked
metamorphosis in the next one hundred years. 2' Individual states displayed an
increasing concern for their sovereignty and sought to settle their own affairs
without interference from other states." When the War of 1812 ended,
American foreign trade was still that of an essentially agricultural people.
Foreign trade blossomed after 1815, only to be followed by a depression three
years later; it did not return to the level attained in the early part of the century
until 1835. Nevertheless, the period from 1815 to the Civil War was generally
characterized by substantial economic growth."' In .1846, a lower tariff policy
"I1d. at 144. The United States Attorney for the District of Pennsylvania, was of the same
opinion. In presenting his contentions to the Court he stated: "So if a sovereign descend from the
throne and become a merchant, he submits to the laws of the country." Id. at 123 n.16 &n.27.
2This lack of evidence was likewise recognized, but accorded little significance, in many
subsequent cases. See. e.g., Berizzi Bros. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
"Samuel Bemis has commented upon circumstances which provoked the change.
The American Revolution, by destroying the British trade walls around thirteen colonies,
made the first great breach in the system of colonial monopoly. The French Revolution
by the exigencies of war itself made the second breach. The Revolution of the SpanishAmerican colonies made the third breach. Of these adventitious circumstances in
international affairs the United States took the fullest advantage.
S. BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 293 (1965).
"Charles Fenwick has commented upon this new "sovereignty" concept:
New principles and new customs developed slowly during the nineteenth century. But side
by side with the new rules of conduct was the growing conception of the sovereignty of the
state, of its independence of any higher control, of its right to determine for itself the
justice of its claims, and of its right to take the law into its own hands when what it
believed to be its vital interests were at stake. . . . The result of the doctrine of
sovereignty was that some jurists came to hold that no rule of international law was
binding unless it had been accepted as such by the particular state. Even for those who did
not go so far the doctrine of sovereignty had the effect of weakening the authority of the
international community as Grotius and his followers conceived it.
C. FENWICK, FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1968).
"An indication of such growth was the export-import relationship during this period: "At the
beginning of the period the people of the country, except for certain abnormal years during the
Napoleonic wars, imported more than they exported, and maintained their overseas commerce
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was established in the United States. Contemporaneously, Great Britain was
also moving in the direction of free trade. Even as the century drew to a close,
state trading had not yet made an impact upon foreign trade policy. The
concept of state trading and government control over a state's centrally planned
economy directly contrasts with the concept of a market-type economy in which
governmental policy influences the operation of the market but does not
supplant it.3 2 With the rise of communism in the Soviet Union and her satellites,
the state trading concept would significantly affect the foreign policy of the
33
United States in the Twentieth Century.
Nineteenth Century decisions, both in the United States and throughout the
world, 3 ' continued to espouse the traditional rule of sovereign immunity
advanced in The Schooner Exchange. Furthermore, early Twentieth Century
decisions indicated that application of the doctrine was not to be limited to
armed public vessels.
II. TWENTIETH CENTURY PRACTICE

A.

1900-1930

The network of international trade which the United States had begun to be
established during the last half of the Nineteenth Century had crystallized
somewhat by 1920.3' Despite an essentially protectionist policy which carried
over into the Twentieth Century, substantial growth continued in international
trade. Tariffs were handled by the legislature, yet it was apparent that someone
in the executive branch needed authority to effect tariff concessions in order to
obtain reciprocal favors.3 By the end of World War 1, American foreign policy
changed considerably as the United States emerged as a world political and
almost exclusively with western Europe. Toward the close, they had begun to export more than they
imported-a signal of the impending industrialization of the nation,-and their trade was webbed
over the seven seas." S. BEMIS, supra note 29, at 306.
nFor an introduction to the formulation of foreign policy in centrally-planned economies, see A.
BROWN & E. NEWBERGER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CENTRAL PLANNING 1-28 (1968).

aSuch a concept could hardly be compatible with a United States foreign policy which had been
influenced by Nineteenth Century laissez-faire capitalism whose basic proposition was that man
was economically motivated and that his behavior was governed by self-interest. J. SPANtER.
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II 12 (1968). It was thought that an international
policy of laissez-faire would benefit all states just as a domestic laissez-faire policy benefited each
individual within the states. Id. at 14.
uSee, e.g.. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822) (by dictum extended
immunity to recognized belligerents, but stated that immunity does not apply to prizes brought into
American territory); L'Invincible, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 238 (1816) (extended the privilege of
immunity to private armed vessels of commissioned privateers); Wally v. Schooner Liberty, 12 La.
98 (1838) (granted immunity to the Republic of Texas before its independence had been recognized,
considering it to be a foreign state at peace with the United States); Long v. The Tampico, 16 F. 491
(S.D.N.Y. 1883) (necessary to show public use and possession, government ownership not being
enough); The Pizarro v. Matthias, 19 F. Cas. 786 (No. 11,199) (S.D.N.Y. 1852) (immunity was
extended to controversies regarding all maritime claims, not merely those concerning title).
3R. ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 372.

Old. at 376.
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economic leader. Marshall's three instances in which immunity was proper
had been modified and expanded in the early part of the new century.
Subsequent cases and comments, mirroring further political and economic
progress, suggested that perhaps the traditional rule of absolute immunity was
no longer appropriate.
During and immediately after World War 1, numerous admiralty cases
discussed the requirements for recognizing a sovereign's immunity plea. It
became the established procedure for a wronged party to file a libel against the'
ship of a foreign sovereign when it entered an American port, thus satisfying
formal jurisdictional prerequisites to proceedings in rem and quasi in rem.u
Whether the suit would proceed to trial was dependant upon the court's
acceptance or rejection of the defendant-sovereign's claim of immunity.
A case by case examination discloses that many courts differed as to which
elements were vital to the recognition of an immunity claim. The pioneer case,
The Schooner Exchange, was interpreted differently to suit the political
demands of the times and to protect ships carrying war cargoes. 3' Writing in
1922, C.C. Hyde indicated there was little doubt that immunity would attach to
vessels both owned and possessed by a foreign sovereign or its departmental
agent, whether such vessels be warships or public ships. On the other hand, he
recognized the difficulty which American courts experienced in regard to
requisitioned merchant vessels."
One such case which involved a requisitioned ship was The A ttualita," a 1916
case which arose out of a libel in rem for damages allegedly caused by the
negligent sinking of libellant's steamship. The district court ordered the release
of the vessel on the ground that The Attualita, while a private commercial ship,
had been requisitioned by the Italian government and directed to carry cargo to
such ports as that government should require. 2 In denying immunity the Fourth
Circuit was reluctant to "take a step beyond that which hald] been taken in any
decided case."3 The court stated that a grant of immunity in this case would
be inexpedient because it would create a class of vessels for which no one
would be either legally or morally responsible." Continuing its analysis, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that if an armed public ship should cause damage while
in the possession and control of a sovereign, the sovereign would be morally
responsible, even if not legally answerable without its consent. If a privately
'See note 24 supra, and accompanying text.
"lt should not be necessary to note that if sovereign immunity is granted, it does not mean that
jurisdiction properly did not exist at the outset. It merely means that a court sitting with competent
jurisdiction in the matter has decided to "relinquish jurisdiction" on the basis of other
considerations. Jurisdiction is properly in existence prior to such a judicial determination.
UE.g., The Roseric, 254 F. 154 (D.N.J. 1918); The Maipo. 252 F. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).

*1 C. HYDE,

INTERNATIONAL LAw

442-43 (1922).

4238 F. 909 (4th Cir. 1916).
4id. at 913n.
"Id. at911;accord.The Beaverton, 273 F. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
"238 F. at 911.
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owned and operated ship should cause damage, its owner would be legally
answerable. However, where a requisitioned vessel caused damage, the
sovereign would no longer have any moral responsibility since it was not
directly in control; and if immunity were granted, there would be no means to
attach legal responsibility. The Fourth Circuit saw this latter situation as one
which would provide no guarantee for the conduct of thousands of individuals
employed upon such ships which, at the time happened to be under order of a
sovereign, either by contract or requisition.'5
Cases of commercial vessels being requisitioned and thereafter devoted to
public service were common during wartime;" the case of The Roseric 7 presents
such a factual setting. There a privately owned steamship requisitioned by the
British government was libelled for damages alleged to have occured in a
negligent collision with a barge in New York harbor. The district court said
that in The Schooner Exchange jurisdictional power had been waived out of due
regard for the dignity and independence of a sister sovereign with whom the
United States was at peace. The court further noted that in The Schooner
Exchange the subject, an armed ship of war, was accorded the privilege of
immunity based on the idea that the sovereign property was devoted to a state
purpose.'8 The Roseric court then reasoned that such a privilege should be
equally applicable to an unarmed vessel which was employed by a sovereign in
the public service. After reviewing British case law" the court stated:
These cases, in my judgment, must be accepted as declaring the judicial
aid.

"With respect to the fear expressed in The Aitualita, C.C. Hyde wrote six years later:
Should the nationalization of merchant vessels, by requisition or any other process,
serve to create a large volume of tonnage engaged under governmental control in commercial enterprise, and notably in foreign trade, there would be reason to withhold exemptions not accorded private ships, unless there was definite understanding that the
State of the flag should assure full responsibility for the conduct of its vessels, and also
place within the reach of the individual claimant a simple and direct means of obtaining
justice. Obviously the matter is one demanding general international agreement to establish a reasonable substitute for the broad yielding of jurisdiction by the territorial sovereign. It should be observed, however, that, in the meantime, any restriction of the existing
right of exemption is hardly a matter within the discretion of the courts. [citing Hough,
J., in The Maipo] While the individual State may not lawfully by legislative enactment
modify the requirements of international law, it may without impropriety express its own
view as to what they demand, and in so doing announce a rule for the guidance of its
courts.
I C. HYDE, supra note 40, at 445-46 (footnotes omitted).

'1254 F. 154 (D.N.J. 1918).
"Id. at 158. To emphasize the purpose for which the vessel was used was not a novel approach. In
The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822). Mr. Justice Story asserted that the
principles announced in The Schooner Exchange are also applicable to foreign public ships; and in
Briggs v. Lightboats, 93 Mass. (I I Allen) 157 (1865), Judge Gray siated that immunity for lifeboats
arises not because they are instruments of war or sovereignty, nor because of the extent of their
actual use, but rather because of the purpose to which they are devoted.
"The Broadmayne, [1916] P. 64 (C.A.); The Parlement Beige, 5 P.D. 197 (C.A. 1880); The
Erissos, rep'd inLloyd's List, Oct. 24, 1917, at 5-8; The Messicano, 32 T.L.R. 519 (1916).
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policy to exercise no jurisdiction over a sovereign, whether local or foreign, or
over instrumentalities employed by it in the public service, by any proceedings
in invitum, regardless of the form or character of the process."
Of persuasive force here was the fact that the United States and Great Britain
were actively engaged in prosecuting a war against a common enemy. Although
the court found the instant situation factually identical to that in The A ttualita,
certain overriding considerations were deemed to be present. The A ttualita had
been decided before the United States became a cobelligerent with the Italian
government in the war against Germany. Furthermore, the Roseric court
disagreed with the assertion in A nualita that the granting of immunity to a
requisitioned ship would create a vessel for which no one would be responsible.
The Roseric court declared that the owner of a requisitioned ship could be made
personally liable for the negligence of his servants in committing a tort while
operating the ship even though the ship itself would be exempt. Thus the court
concluded that the prior decision in The Attualita "unduly subordinates the
rights of sovereignty to those of the individual."' 5 This was found to be contrary
to the immunity provided the state for instrumentalities of the sovereign which
are devoted to public service-an immunity based on notions of dignity, inde-

pendence and the well-being of the nation. The Roseric court then held that it
is not ownership or exclusive possession of the instrumentality by the sovereign,
but its appropriation and devotion to public service that exempts the sovereign
from judicial process. 5 A decree was appropriately entered to stay all proceedings to arrest or detain the ship as long as she continued to be in the service of
the British government.
In a similar case decided just four months earlier, a New York district court
granted immunity, but reached its decision by a slightly different route. In The
Maipo,5 a libel was filed against a ship owned by the Chilean government for
damages to a cargo of hides sold by the Chilean government to a United States
merchant. The hides were being transported to the United States by a private
party to which the sovereign had chartered" the vessel. Libellant argued that, in
entering into the charter agreement, the Chilean government was permitting its
vessel to be used for private commercial purposes and thus immunity should not
be granted. The court asserted that the view of the American judiciary had
consistently been in the direction of holding immune property both owned and
possessed by a sovereign.5 This court likewise noted that the exigencies of war
0254 F. at 159.
'd. at 161.
Old. at 161-62.
-252 F. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
"The charter party, the contract by which the ship was let to the merchant, revealed that the
Chilean government intended that all acts of the ship's captain were to be regarded as those of his
government. Id. at 629.
uld. at 630. "[Wlhen ownership and possession are both present, the res is immune unless
otherwise provided by some permissive or concessionary statute." Id. The court further noted that
recent cases arising in tort are not distinguishable from those growing out of a breach of contract.
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may lead a government to man otherwise commercial ships, for instance, and
that although such enterprise may be regarded as commercial in substance, they
are of great benefit to its citizens at large. In the opinion of the court, any loss
which might occur when local individuals deal with foreign sovereigns or when
foreign individuals deal with the local sovereign is outweighed by the ultimate
benefit to the individual's country. The public purpose idea, expressly
recognized in The Roseric, was the underlying notion upon which immunity was
grounded in The Maipo. To the argument that people who deal with a vessel
thus immune may be put to great inconvenience and expense when seeking
claims for relief in foreign jurisdictions, the court replied:
[Wihen one knows with whom he is dealing and the law applicable, he must
arrange accordingly. This may be difficult, but in these days of rapid changes,
accommodation to new conditions is accomplished effectively and
expeditiously."

The Maipo opinion would seem to be overly broad since any foreign
sovereign who engages in commercial activities will ultimately be able to justify
his acts by finding the requisite "public purpose" in the benefits to be derived
by the foreign citizens. At least the analysis would seem to be invalid during
peacetime when applied to states whose economies are geared to free market
pricing mechanisms. 7
In both The Roseric and The Maipo the courts were quick to emphasize the
wartime need for cooperation among allies. Thus it may be said that these two
cases, in sharp contrast to The Altualita where the court refused to take an
"inexpedient step," were precipitated more by the need during World War I for
stable international relations among political allies, than by a well-founded
reliance upon either the express dictates of The Schooner Exchange or general
guidelines established in other early decisions. World War I clearly altered the
position of the United States regarding international relations. A necessary
result of the war was an alignment of powers. While the courts recognized and
stressed the need for cooperation among allies, it has been said that the United
States did not enter into its "association" with Britain and France to begin a
permanent alignment against its "enemies," but rather to promote world peace
and to protect against war in general and its recurrence."
As well as revealing apparent differences in the substantive law, these three
"Id.
T
Such an economic theory rests on the premise that the greater benefit accrues to both the private
competitor and his trading partner when pricing mechanisms operate in free markets. The
contentions asserted by Judge Mayer would appear to favor the development of state-controlled
trade since, to a state employing such economic controls, there would be a benefit to the whole of the
state. There is clear evidence, however, that Judge Mayer did not intend such rationale to be
extended beyond a wartime situation. The use of such phrases as "requirements of this
extraordinary war" and "to be detained by the process at this time" are clearly of a limiting nature.
Id. at 631.

"F. HARTMANN, supra note 8,at 430.
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cases reveal distinctions in the handling of the procedural aspects relating to the
question of sovereign immunity. Eleven days after the filing of the action in The
A ttualita,the United States attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, acting
as an agent of the Attorney General of the United States, brought certain
matters to the attention of the court. 5' After comparing this suggestion with that
received in The Schooner Exchange, the court stated that while the latter
suggestion demanded the ship's release, here the State Department had carefully
refrained from such a demand." The Attualita court then concluded that a
suggestion which does not contain a "demand" by the State Department does
not constitute a decision by the executive branch on a political question; the
instant suggestion was thus accorded little or no weight.
A somewhat different procedure was followed in The Maipo. There, a
suggestion, submitted to the court by the representative of the Chilean
Ambassador, stated that The Maipo was owned and possessed by the Chilean
government, operated by a Chilean crew, and carried a cargo belonging to that
government. The foreign ambassador's suggestion, which was accompanied by
the certificate of the Secretary of State of the United States merely accrediting
him as the proper representative, also included a specific request for immunity.
The court, citing the British case The Parlement Beige," stated that the factual
allegations contained in the suggestion were not open to question and must be
accepted as made. The court further stated that it was not necessary that such
suggestion be made by a department of the United States Government: "It is
enough that the fact is presented to the court, as here, by the duly accredited
official of the foreign government.""' When the United States Department of
State declared that it has "no intention of interfering with the legal
proceedings," 3 the district court accepted such comment as merely leaving the
matter to be disposed of by the court in due course. 4
"The Attorney General had received a communication from the United States Secretary of State
to the effect that the Italian Ambassador advised the State Department that The Attualita had been
requisitioned by the Italian government at the time of the attachment.
The district attorney's "suggestion" noted the case of The Luigi, 230 F. 493 (E.D. Pa. 1916), and
concluded by stating that
in bringing this matter to the attention of the court the United States does not intervene
as an interested party, nor do I appear either for the United States or for the Italian
government, but I present the suggestion . . . as a matter of comity between the United
States government and the Italian government, for such consideration as the court may
deem necessary and proper.
The Attualita, 238 F. 909, 910 (4th Cir. 1916).
*Perhaps the court's reliance upon a comparison between the instant suggestion and that in The
Schooner Exchange was misplaced. In The Schooner Exchange the Court did not really base its
decision upon the executive suggestion. Instead, the decision was more properly grounded in general
legal concepts.
'15P.D. 197, 210, 211 (C.A. 1880).
252 F. at 628.
Old.
"Upon an examination of the facts which revealed a finding of possession and ownership in the
foreign sovereign, the court granted immunity. Relevant evidence, in addition to allegations in the
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In The Roseric, counsel for the British Embassy, appearing as amicus curiae,
filed a suggestion with the court which stated that the ship had been
appropriated by the British government, was devoted to public service, and thus
all proceedings should be stayed." The court said that since the allegations in
the suggestion had not been put in issue, it was deemed conclusive as to all
material statements of fact unless that suggestion was not properly presented to
the court." Although there had been cases in which courts had declined to
receive suggestions presented by representatives of a foreign government," the
source from which a suggestion may be received was held to be a matter of
judicial discretion, each case to be governed by its own circumstances." The
court concluded that in the absence of an intimation from the executive branch
in opposition, rejection of the suggestion would not be justified, especially in
view of the joint war effort."
The Supreme Court of the United States acted to clarify the formal
procedural means of presenting a suggestion to a court in the 1921 case of Ex
parte Muir," a libel for damages to a privately owned ship resulting from a
collision with a British steamship. Private counsel for the British Embassy,
appearing as amicus curiae," presented a written request to the Court to the
effect that jurisdiction should be relinquished in as much as the steamship had
been requisitioned into the service of the British government and was carrying a
cargo of wheat belonging to that government. This procedure, found sufficient
in The Roseric, was disallowed by the Supreme Court." The Court commented
upon the proper avenues of presentation:
As of right the British Government was entitled to appear in the suit, to
propound its claim to the vessel and to raise the jurisdictional question. Or,
with its sanction, its accredited and recognized representative might have
suggestion, included the charter party signed by the officer of the Chilean Navy in charge of vessel.
See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
"254 F. at 156.
"Id. at 163, citing The Luigi, 230 F.493 (E.D. Pa. 1916).
'7See, e.g., The Luigi, 230 F.493 (E.D. Pa. 1916); The Florence H., 248 F. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
In The Luigi, an oral suggestion made in open court was rejected; inasmuch as the suggestion raised
a question of international immunity, the court held it should have come through official United
States governmental channels. In The Florence H.. the court held that a suggestion would not be
received unless it came through the diplomatic channels.
U254 F. at 163.
"in commenting upon the proper presentation of suggestions, the court stated:
It is not merely a proper, but a commendable, practice for such suggestions to come
through the Attorney General or one of his representatives; but is it to be disregarded
unless it does so come. [sic] No case has been cited that holds as a matter of law that such
a suggestion will not be received from a foreign sovereign's official representative.
Id.

-254 U.S. 522 (1921).
'This procedure was identical to that employed inThe Roseric, 254 F. 154 (D.N.J. 1918). Cf The
Florence H., 248 F. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
11254 U.S. at 533.
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appeared and have taken the same steps in its interest. And, if there was
objection to appearing as a suitor in a foreign court, it was open to that
government to make the asserted public status and immunity of the vessel the
subject of diplomatic representations to the end that, if that claim was
recognized by the Executive Department of this government, it might be set
forth and supported in an appropriate suggestion to the court by the Attorney
3
General, or some law officer acting under Iiis direction.
The reasons listed by the Court for recognizing only these means of
presentation were that it makes for better international relations, it conforms
to diplomatic usage in other matters, it accords the executive department proper
respect, and it tends to promote harmony of action and uniformity of
decisions. 71 Since the claim of immunity was not directly presented by the
domestic government, the foreign sovereign or the foreign sovereign's
representative, the immunity plea was not accepted.
This procedure was to undergo modification as subsequent cases enabled the
courts to be even more precise regarding who might represent a foreign
sovereign and the manner in which such representation might be undertaken.75
Additionally, there seemed to be a requirement that a- suggestion be timely
presented.' Even after the Muir decision clarified the manner in which
suggestions were to be presented, other more subtle questions of procedure were
presented. Confusion existed as to the general effect to be given an affirmative
suggestion of immunity presented to the courts through the United States
Department of State, as to the effect of a Department suggestion that immunity
is not appropriate and as to a Department decision not to make a suggestion of
either immunity or liability. It is questionable whether these questions have
been answered satisfactorily today."
After World War 1, increasing disfavor was expressed concerning the thenexisting substantive rule of absolute immunity. This criticism probably resulted
from the presence of governmental operations in fields previously left entirely to
private action. Congress recognized the need to treat government in the private
sector with the equal dignity and liability accorded the individual,78 and there
was evidence that the Department of State disagreed with the courts in their
general application of the traditional rule of immunity. In 1921 the Italian
7id. at 532-33 (citations omitted).
"id. at 533.
73See. e.g., The Gul Djemal, 264 U.S. 90 (1924) (suggestion presented by the Captain of the
Turkish Navy was inappropriate); The Sao Vicente, 260 U.S. 151 (1922) (Consul General, without
specific authorization is not the appropriate representative merely by virtue of his office).
"See, e.g.. Dexter and Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931).
"See note 112 infra, and accompanying text.
15Acts passed in 1916, 1920, and 1925 allow the United States government to be sued for wrongs
done by its vessels. Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 740-52 (1964); Public
Vessels Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-99 (1964); The Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42
(1964).
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Ambassador wrote to the Department in an effort to prevent arrest of the
Italian steamship Pesaro. The State Department replied that any commercial
vessel, notwithstanding ownership by a foreign sovereign, should be subject to
legal process in the local jurisdiction.7 ' In The Pesaro" a libel in rem was
brought to enforce a claim for damage to the cargo. The Solicitor for the
Department, in reply to an inquiry from the court, asserted in August of 1921
that:
It is the view of the Department that government-owned merchant vessels or
vessels under requisition of governments whose flag they fly employed in
commerce should not be regarded as entitled to the immunities accorded public
vessels of war. The Department has not claimed immunity for American vessels
of this character.8'
Judge Mack prefaced the opinion of the court for the Southern District of New
York with these remarks:
The Supreme Court has recently intimated that it considered the question
whether the ship of a foreign government used and operated by it as a merchant
vessel is, when within the waters of the United States, immune from arrest in
admiralty, as "important and also new," and that the "proper solution is not
plain but debatable." Bey; In re Muir. For that reason a re-examination of this
question would seem to be justified, if not required, notwithstanding the
decision in this court in The Maipo and the views expressed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals in The Carlo Poma, especially as the decree in the latter case
was vacated by the Supreme Court for want of jurisdiction in the Court of
Appeals.82
The court recognized that while the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity
had been defended by some jurists as vital and fundamental to sovereignty, the
extent to which it was retained had been the subject of strong criticism.
Furthermore, there was a tendency to restrict its application or to guard against
its extension. 3 The court determined that its decision should "conform to the
practical ends of the law in a moving, working world."u That is, the court
considered its function not to be that of merely looking into history and logic,
but that of inquiring whether public interest justifies or requires an extension of
non-exemption beyond the usual processes of judicial justice.M Further, the
opinion indicated that the effect of continued recognition of absolute immunity

"2G. HACKWORTH,

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 429-37 (1941).

-277 F.473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), rev'd, 255 U.S. 216 (1921), dismissed on rehearing. 13 F.2d 468
(S.
D.N.Y. 1926), affd sub noma.
Berizzi Bros. v.S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S.562 (1926).
"Id. at 479-80 n.3.
'21d. at 474 (citations omitted).
"See sources cited id. at 475.
uld.

'Id. The court stated that the responsibility of a ship in admiralty is derived not from common
law or civil law, but from "the commercial usages and jurisprudence of the middle ages, and
earlier." Id. at 48 1.
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might be to discourage those individuals who sought to do business with foreign
governments, agencies of the government or government-controlled industries
and companies. Perhaps it may be said that the risk of dealing with a sovereign
who has the advantage of immunity, far outweighed in the early 1800's by the
need for foreign trade, was appearing to be of no little consequence by the
1920's. As to the requirements for successful business enterprise, the court
commented:
To deprive parties injured in the ordinary course of trade of their common and
well-established legal remedies would not only work great hardship on them,
but in the long run it would operate to the disadvantage and detriment of those
in whose favor the immunity might be granted. Shippers would hestitate to
trade with government ships, and salvors would run few risks to save the
property of friendly sovereigns, if they were denied recourse to our own courts
and left to prosecute their claims in foreign tribunals in distant lands."
The court concluded that any government ship should not be per se immune
from seizure, but rather the vessel should be immune only if it is engaged in the
public service. Judge Mack's definition of public service did not, however,
extend to commercial activities during peacetime. Since The Pesaro was
employed as an ordinary merchant ship at a time in which no wartime
emergencies existed and there had been no suggestion of immunity from the
Department, the court determined that the vessel should not be immune from
arrest in admiralty.8
In a supplemental opinion" Judge Mack considered European case law and
commented on the subject of sovereign immunity. Noting that there existed a
conflict of opinion between the various continental states, he concluded that an
examination of foreign law only served to strengthen his decision. This opinion
also answered the argument, advanced by jurists favoring the absolute
approach, that to hold the foreign sovereign amenable to suit in American
courts would do harm to the fragile network of international relations:
[lit seems improbable that in these days the judicial seizure of a publicly owned
merchantman like the Pesaro would affect our foreign relations in any greater
degree than the judicial seizure of a great privately owned merchantman like
the Aquitania. Indeed, it would seem that foreign relations are much less likely
to be disturbed if the rights and obligations of foreign states growing out of
their ordinary civil transactions were dealt with by the established rules of law,
than if they were made a matter of diplomatic concern."
"Id.
"Id. at 48 1. The court found, in the vital fact that The Pesaro itself was subject to the ordinary
processes of the Italian court, what Mr. Justice Marshall writing in The Schooner Exchange might
have considered similar to an implied consent to be sued.
"Id. at 483.
Oid. at 485. Two years later Judge Mack commented further upon the validity of a sovereign
being held absolutely immune:
There is no principle of public law exempting a foreign state from its obligations under
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The restrictive approach to the issue of sovereign immunity, espoused by both
the State Department and the district court, was repudiated by the Supreme
Court in 1926. In Berizzi Bros. v. The S.S. Pesaro,N a later suit arising out of
the same facts, Mr. Justice Van Devanter demonstrated adherence to the
traditional rule of sovereign immunity-the majority view taken in other courts
prior to 1926."1 While acknowledging that The Schooner Exchange contained
no reference to merchant ships owned and operated by a foreign sovereign, the
Court deemed this to be insignificant in light of the relative absence in 1812 of
government activity in areas of commercial enterprise. The immunity
announced in The Schooner Exchange was therefore deemed applicable to all
ships held and used by a foreign government for a public purpose. The Supreme
Court, however, was willing to extend the definition of "public purpose"
beyond the limited meaning proscribed by Judge Mack in the 1921 decision."
That is, the Court saw no reason to regard the advancement of the economic
welfare of a country in time of peace any less a public purpose than the
maintenance of a naval force." Thus, the Supreme Court in Berizzi Bros.
rejected Judge Mack's view of a relative sovereign immunity based on the
distinction between public service acts and private acts, in favor of absolute
sovereign immunity." This decision became the guiding principle for both the
executive and judicial branches in subsequent cases.
B.

1930-1950-The Restrictive Approach

Protectionist policy was still in vogue after World War I, presumably to
insulate a glut of newly established goods and industries. In 1930 the HawleyThere may be sound reasons of public policy why a state should be immune
the law ....
from the harassment of litigation in forums and under conditions not agreeable to the
state. But, once the state has chosen its forum, there seems little reason in law or policy
why it should not be subject to the substantive requirements of law and justice.
The Gloria v. Federal Sugar Ref. Corp., 286 F. 188, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
-271 U.S. 562 (1926). The district court order of Judge Mack was vacated by consent of the
parties following the decision in The Gul Djemal, concerning the procedure for claiming immunity.
See note 75 supra. The Italian Ambassador filed a claim and answer; the court granted immunity to
The Pesaro, believing the weight of authority to be contrary to Judge Mack. The Pesaro, 13 F.2d
468 (S.D.N.Y. 1926). On appeal, the Supreme Court only considered the sovereign immunity
question.
"1E.g., The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 49 (1922); The Carlo Poma, 259 F. 369 (2d Cir. 1919),
rev'd, 255 U.S. 219 (1921); The Rogday, 279 F. 130 (N.D. Cal. 1920); The Maipo, 252 F. 627
(S.D.N.Y. 1918).
"The Supreme Court of the United States was therefore in conflict with the delegates to the 1926
Brussels Maritime Conference who, like Judge Mack, acknowledged the distinction between public
and private governmental vessels. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to the Immunity of State-owned Vessels, adopted Apr. 10, 1926, 176 L.N.T.S. 199. See
Franck, The New Law For The Seas, 42 L.Q. REv. 308 (1926).
-271 U.S. at 574. The court cited a number of English cases, among them The Parlement Beige, 5
P.D. 197 (C.A. 1880); in support of its position of immunity with regard to public merchant vessels.
The view taken by the Court was that all acts of a sovereign, including commercial activity, are
immune since they are undertaken for a public purpose. See note 47 supra and accompanying text
for a similar public purpose rationale recited by the court in The Roseric.
"in doing so, the Court also rejected the express view of the executive branch that a vessel such as
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S moot tariff raised duties even higher, only to touch off similar tariff increases
abroad. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was passed by Congress in 1934
and successively renewed. The creditor status that had previously been attained
did a turnabout after 1929, and by 1940 the United States was practically a
debtor nation again.9 In spite of the Supreme Court's decision in Berizzi Bros.,
application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity was still somewhat uncertain
in 1930."
In a case decided prior to the outbreak of World War 11, one of the
1
procedural questions left unanswered in Ex parte Muir"
was discussed. In
Compania Espanola De Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar,"8 a suit
to recover possession of a Spanish merchant vessel allegedly seized by the
Republic of Spain, the Department of State refused to recommend immunity to
the court but advised the Spanish Ambassador that he was entitled to appear
directly before the court. The district court conducted a hearing to determine
the relevant issues of fact raised by the Ambassador's suggestion and other
evidence introduced, and concluded that The Navemar was neither in the
possession of the Spanish government nor in its public service." The Court of
Appeals, however, declared that an inquiry into the facts was inappropriate
since the suggestion must be given conclusive effect. Thus, the Second Circuit
held the vessel immune from suit in the courts of the United States.'" On
certiorari the Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Circuit.' 0' The Court
proclaimed that there are two basic means by which a foreign sovereign can
claim immunity--either through diplomatic channels, or as a claimant in
the Pesaro should not be accorded the immunity given to vessels of war. See The Pesaro 277 F. 473,
479 n.3 (S. D.N.Y. 1921), and discussion at note 80 supra.
"R. ROBERTSON, supra note 9, at 598-99.
"Disposition of the doctrine throughout the world was just as uncertain. In 1933, after surveying
foreign decisions, G. G. Fitzmaurice wrote:
The foregoing analysis, which includes most of the states having specially advanced
systems of jurisprudence, indicates a very considerable divergence in the practice of
nations on this subject, not only on matters of broad principle, but also on a number of
minor points. Applying the rule, therefore, that international law depends on the practice
of states, it is clear that international law on this question must be regarded as uncertain.
Fitzmaurice, State Immunity From Proceedings in Foreign Courts, 14 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 101,
117-18 (1933).
7
See discussion in text accompanying note 70 supra. Ex Parte Muir clarified the acceptable
methods of presenting a suggestion; however it did not speak to the weight to be given various types
of suggestions, nor to the importance of their sources.
"303 U.S. 68 (1938).
9re Navemar, 18 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), rev'd. 90 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1937), rev'd sub
noma.Compania Espanole De Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
'rhe Navemar, 90 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1937), revd sub nora. Compania Espanola De Navegacion
Maritima, S.A. V. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
Tr'The Court did agree as to the substantive issue. It stated that the engagement of the vessel of a
friendly government, if in its possession and service, is a public vessel and immune from legal
process even though it may be transporting cargo for hire. 303 U.S. at 74.
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court. 0 1 After the Secretary of State's refusal to suggest immunity, the
Ambassador had chosen the latter alternative.
However, the Supreme Court stated that the Second Circuit was not bound to
treat as conclusive the allegations in a suggestion filed by a foreign ambassador
as a claimant in court. In reply to the question whether it was the duty of the
court, upon presentation of this type of suggestion, to dismiss the libel for want
of admiralty jurisdiction, the Supreme Court answered:
[Tihe filed suggestion, though sufficient as a statement of the contentions
made, was not proof of its allegations. This Court has explicitly declined to give
such a suggestion the force of proof or the status of a like suggestion coming
from the executive department of our government.'
The alleged absence of jurisdiction due to the public status of the vessel was
therefore an appropriate subject for judicial inquiry where the immunity request
came directly from the foreign sovereign. Nevertheless, in dictum the Court
made it clear that a suggestion emanating from the United States executive
branch would be given conclusive effect. ' 0
In a subsequent opinion written by Mr. Justice Stone, the Supreme Court
applied the analysis in The Navemar and further examined the effect of an
executive suggestion. In Ex parte Republic of Peru,'" a Cuban corporation
libelled the vessel Ucayali for the failure of its owner, a corporate agent of the
Peruvian government, to transport a cargo of sugar from a Peruvian port to
New York. Pursuant to the foreign sovereign's request for executive recognition
of the immunity claim, the State Department issued a formal suggestion of
immunity from jurisdiction.'" Viewing as necessary the judicial recognition of,
and deference to, the foreign affairs powers possessed by the President and the
Department of State, the Court asserted:
[lit is of public importance that the action of the political arm of the
Government taken within its appropriate sphere be promptly recognized, and
that the delay and inconvenience of a prolonged litigation be avoided by
prompt termination of the proceedings in the district court.'7
Relying upon The Navemar and The Schooner Exchange, the Court set forth
the appropriate treatment to be accorded a formal executive suggestion of
immunity:
The certification and the request [from the State Department] that the vessel be
declared immune must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive determination
by the political arm of the Government that the continued retention of the
vessel interferes with the proper conduct of our foreign relations. Upon the
1621d.

'Old. at 75.
'"Id. at 74.
1-318 U.S. 578 (1943).
'"Id.at 58 1.
"lid.at 587.
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submission of this certification to the district court, it became the court's duty,
in conformity to established principles, to release the vessel and to proceed no
further in the cause.'"

If immunity had not been recognized by the Department, however, the Court
indicated that it would have been proper for the lower court to determine for
itself whether immunity existed.'" The Supreme Court also stated that a foreign
sovereign does not waive its right to claim immunity merely because it has seen
fit to preserve its right to interpose other defenses."$
A comparision of the decision in Peru with that in Berizzi Bros. demonstrates
that the Supreme Court had come full circle. The vessel in the 1926 case was
owned and operated by the foreign sovereign. The Supreme Court held that ship
to be immune, in opposition to an opinion issued by the State Department to the
effect that immunity was not proper. Berizzi Bros. was thus based more upon
general international law than upon reliance on executive policy as announced.
Thereafter the State Department attempted to issue suggestions in succeeding
cases which conformed to that pronouncement of the highest court in the land.
The vessel in Peru was also owned and operated by the foreign sovereign. There,
the holding of immunity was based upon the view that to decide otherwise, in
light of the Department's suggestion of immunity, would cause the executive
branch undue embarrassment in carrying out its duties with respect to foreign
affairs."' So, while the Department made an effort to align its subsequent
statements of policy toward sovereign immunity with the Supreme Court's
ruling in Berizzi Bros., the Peru decision by the same Court in 1943 ironically
stood for the proposition that the judicary should conform itself to the views of
the executive branch.
From the decisions in The Navemar and Ex parte Peru, the duty of a court
when confronted with an affirmative recommendation of immunity would seem
to be clear. If a suggestion has come through the United States Department of
State, it is conclusive and the sovereign is entitled to immunity. If the suggestion has been filed directly with the court by a sovereign appearing as a claimant, the allegations are not binding and judicial inquiry is proper. The result
would seem to be that the executive branch may effect immunity as a matter of
law, if existing foreign policy should so require, thus depriving the judiciary of
an opportunity to examine the facts. Immunity may therefore be granted in certain cases despite the absence of certain factual elements held vital in prior
cases. The duty of the court is not well defined, however, when the executive
branch decides not to recommend immunity after a request by a foreign sover'Old.at 589.
Court specified that such determination should be based on "whether the vessel when
'he
seized was petitioner's, and was of a character entitling it to the immunity." Id. at 588.
"'id. at 589. Further, the Court refused to rule that immunity had been waived even though such
claim of immunity had been asserted before both the Department and the district court. Neither
method of asserting the immunity was deemed to be incompatible with the other.
"'id.at 588.
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eign. Can the intent that immunity should not be granted by the courts be inferred from such executive silence? Further, can express inaction by the executive, where the Department merely asserts that it wishes to take no position on
the issue, be presumed to grant the judicial branch free rein in the matter?"'
Reliance upon executive discretion was carried one step further in Republic of
Mexico v. Hoffman," a 1945 Supreme Court decision, once again
written by Mr. Justice Stone. A libel in rem was tiled against a Mexican vessel
for damage caused in a collision. The Mexican Ambassador filed a suggestion
in the district court, claiming that the ship was owned by the Republic of
Mexico, possessed by it, and engaged in transporting cargo for it. A
communication from the Secretary of State to the Attorney General was filed.
It merely noted the existence of the claim of the foreign government. No
position was taken with regard to the allegations contained therein other than to
direct the court's attention to Ervin v. Quintanilla"' and Compania Espanola
De Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar."t5 In the Ervin case the Fifth
Circuit had granted immunity since the vessel was in the possession and service
of the foreign sovereign at the time of the seizure; in The Navemar, the executive
branch had failed to recognize the claimed immunity and the Supreme Court
had denied immunity to a ship neither possessed nor in the service of a foreign
sovereign. The district court denied the claim, the Mexican government filed an
answer to the libel in which it renewed its claim of immunity, and a trial was
held on the merits. Another communication from the State Department to the
Attorney General was filed, accepting only the allegations of ownership in the
foreign sovereign. The district court found that the ship was in the possession,
operation and control of the Mexican corporation, not the Mexican government, and denied immunity."' The Ninth Circuit's decision to affirm was
based on the absence of possession and public service. "7
On certiorari the Supreme Court considered the question of whether title,
without possession, is sufficient grounds for recognizing sovereign immunity.
'The answers to these questions have been made difficult because the means by which courts are
apprised of executive opinions have varied. In appropriate cases the State Department has: issued
immunity suggestions to the court in response to a request from a foreign sovereign, recognized the
factual allegations of the claim but declined to suggest immunity, replied that the Department will
leave the matter to the courts, maintained executive silence on the matter and made an affirmative
suggestion of liability. There has been no formalized uniformity with regard to the procedural
aspects, so it is understandable that courts have been confused as to the weight which should be
accorded these various expressions. What have been termed "suggestions" might more accurately
have been called "demands," "refusals," "comments" and, occasionally, "double-talk."
.. 324 U.S. 30 (1945). Despite the expansive decision in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman. most
courts have refused to go beyond the Peru holding.
1199 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 635 (1939).
115303 U.S. 68 (1938).

"'The Baja California, 45 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Cal. 1942), affJd sub nom. Republic of Mexico v.

Hoffman, 143 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1944), affd, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).

"T Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 143 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1944), affd, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
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Citing a number of supporting cases,118 the Court asserted that since The
Schooner Exchange decision, the United States government had recognized
immunity when a vessel is in the possession and service of a friendly sovereign.
This surrender of jurisdiction was based on a policy, recognized by the State
Department and the courts, that national interest is best served when such
controversies are handled diplomatically rather than under the compulsion of
judicial proceedings. In the absence of executive recognition of an immunity
claim, it would thereafter be for the courts to determine whether the requisites of
immunity exist. Moreover, when a judicial proceeding has an effect upon
relations with the foreign sovereign, it was deemed a "guiding principle" in
considering whether immunity is proper, to determine whether the executive
department would be embarrassed in its conduct of foreign affairs by a refusal
of immunity."' The Supreme Court then formulated the following principle: "It
is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has
seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government
has not seen fit to recognize.'' Thus, when a foreign sovereign follows an
alternative course and presents its immunity claim by appearance, the court
should consider whether the basis for the claim is one recognized by the
established policy of the department.'
The executive suggestion in Hoffman made no demand for immunity. It
merely recited that the foreign sovereign owned the vessel; yet from this express
"'Cases cited by the Court were: Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Compania Esponola De
Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938); Ex Parte New York, 256 U.S.
503 (1921); The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216 (1921); Ex Parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921); United States v.
Cornell Steamboat Co., 202 U.S. 184 (1905); The Divina Postora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52 (1819);
L'lnvincible, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 238 (1816).
"'324 U.S. at 35.
'"id. In a footnote to this statement, it was declared that in Berizzi Brothers the Court had
granted immunity to a merchant vessel owned, possessed and in the service of a foreign sovereign,
even though the State Department had declined to recognize immunity; the propriety of this was not
considered. Since the Hoffman vessel was not in possession and service of the foreign sovereign, the
Hoffman court thus did not have the opportunity to rule on the question directly presented in Berizzi
Brothers. Id. at 35 n.I.
It is to be noted that this principle was quoted in the later case of Victory Transport, Inc. v.
Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transporte, 336 F.2d 354, 358 (1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 934 (1965). Although the Second Circuit in that ease admitted that it had received various
interpretations, it stated:
[W]e think it means at least that the courts should deny immunity where the State
Department has indicated, either directly or indirectly, that immunity need not be
accorded. It makes no sense for the courts to deny a litigant his day in court and to
permit the disregard of legal obligations to avoid embarrassing the State Department if
that agency indicates it will not be embarrassed.
Id. at 358.
21
1 1n expressing its understanding of the executive department's policy, the Hoffman Court stated:
"[sluch a policy, long and consistently recognized and often certified by the State Department and
for that reason acted upon by the courts even when not so certified, is that of allowing the immunity
from suit of a vessel in the possession and service of a foreign government." 324 U.S. at 36.
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inaction the Court apparently implied a "suggestion of liability." The Court
stated that there was no evidence that the Department had ever allowed
immunity on the basis of "title" alone, and that a similar position had been
consistently taken by the courts.'2 Of controlling importance was the fact that
despite numerous opportunities, the executive department had never recognized
immunity.for a vessel owned, but not possessed by, a foreign government.' m In
affirming the denial of immunity below, the Supreme Court declared:
[I]t is the national policy not to extend the immunity in the manner now
suggested, and . . . it is the duty of the courts, in a matter so intimately
associated with our foreign policy and which may profoundly affect it, not to
enlarge an immunity to an extent which the government, although often asked,
2
has not seen fit to recognize.' '
The apparent effect of the Hoffman decision is that when the State Department
makes no suggestion of immunity, the courts will look to established "national
policy" in similar factual situations.
However, it may be argued that such treatment gives no weight to the refusal
of the Department to act when specifically requested to do so by the foreign
sovereign. That is, when the State Department reviews a case and decides not to
file an immunity suggestion, is it not necessarily making a determination of
present executive policy? The court, in the absence of a suggestion, will decide
the case on the basis of past "national policy," which policy may consist of
cases previously decided in which the Department did issue a suggestion. So
while the court applies established policy to the facts, mere inaction will not
enable the Department to create present policy and have it recognized by the
courts. In a nation of changing political and economic spheres, the United
States Department of State thus has only a limited power to effect parallel
changes in the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The only means available would
be an affirmative policy pronouncement -in some instances this would amount
to a suggestion of liability-mere silence not being enough. Nevertheless, in
Berizzi Bros. the Court refused to adhere to just such an affirmative statement
against granting immunity.125 If the Department recommends liability in some
cases, rather than leaving the determination to the courts, would such conduct
be likely to impede the Department's foreign affairs activities? It is arguable
that it would, since the conduct of international relations is a direct function of
the executive department. On the other hand, whether a denial of immunity is
directly traceable to the judicial or executive branches, the decision would
ultimately be viewed as that of the United States government.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion to Hoffman, offered an
"See id. at 38 and cases cited therein.
'"Lauterpacht has referred to the requirement of possession as an indirect approach to an
overthrow of the concept of absolute liability. Lauterpacht, supra qote 3, at 269.
1"324 U.S. at 38.
"See G. HACKWORTH, supra note 79.
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interpretation of the majority's holding. In Berizzi Bros., said Frankfurter, the
Supreme Court felt free to reject the Department's policy-oriented views, while
in the instant case the Court declared that the issue was to be decided in
conformity with principles adopted by the Department in conducting United
States foreign relations. He further noted that "possession" is too tenuous a
distinction upon which to differentiate between foreign government-owned
merchant ships that are immune from suit and those that are not. Frankfurter
reasoned that the presence of one junior naval officer on one of its merchantmen
might be enough to establish possession by the Republic of Mexico, or that a
similar finding could be effected merely by varying the terms of the financial
arrangement of the enterprise.'2
Frankfurter also observed the enormous growth in recent years of
commercial activity by the government. He noted with approval the comments
of Lord Maugham in the 1938 British case The Cristina:
"iT]here has been a very large development of State-owned commercial ships
since the Great War, and the question whether the immunity should continue to
be given to ordinary trading ships has become acute. Is it consistent with
sovereign dignity to acquire a tramp steamer and to compete with ordinary
shippers and ship-owners in the markets of the world?"''1
He declared that Berizzi Bros. had been based on considerations no longer valid
twenty years later, and concluded that perhaps the case should be reconsidered
in light of the recent developments to which Lord Maugham referred. Justice
Frankfurter then stated that courts should not reject jurisdiction except when
the executive branch or Congress explicitly asserts that the proper conduct of
foreign relations requires judicial abstention.'2 Under this interpretation, the
court should assume jurisdiction whenever the Department has not suggested
immunity. The majority's rule in Hoffman is that if a suggestion is issued it
must be followed, and that if none is issued the judicial determination should be
made based on evidence of past national policy. Frankfurter would stop just
short of this proposition; he would urge that in the absence of a suggestion, the
judiciary should not disclaim the jurisdiction which rightly belongs to them but
ought to determine the issue without being bound to examine and apply past
executive policy.'" But, would not Frankfurter's position ultimately confer
upon the courts the power and, before long, the duty to assert something akin to
a "judicial foreign policy?"
Though the courts have generally refused to adopt the total-executive
approach of the Hoffman case, Frankfurter's concurring opinion also does not
represent the majority view after 1945. Interpreting the Hoffman decision as
evidencing judicial willingness to entrust the Department with the power of a
1"324 U.S. at 40.
'"Id.at 41 (quoting from The Christina, [19381 A.C. 485, 521-22).
'bid. at 41-42.
'Did.
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court of law, more than one commentator has criticized Justice Stone's
treatment of the case.'0 Although it was clear after Hoffman that Berizzi Bros.
was no longer controlling, precise guidelines remained to be formulated.
The "important developments in the international scene that twenty years
have brought," to which Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred, included movement
toward greater state trading.' This concept, which involves state control of
foreign trade, was in evidience prior to World War 1, but by 1945 it had become
an established institution in certain countries. The importance of state trading
did not cease with World War 11, but continued to grow in the next three
decades. In fact, probably no country in the world today can be said to rely
entirely on free trade mechanisms. While the United States has realized that it
must enter into state trading to some limited extent, it has preferred to foster
free enterprise. Just as the foreign economic trend has been in the direction of
greater state control, buttressed by conforming foreign policy decisions, the
trend of decisions analyzing the substantive aspect of sovereign immunity has
been most definitely of a restrictive nature. Likewise, the procedural aspect of
sovereign immunity has been handled by the courts to reflect considerable
respect for executive opinion.
C.

The "Tate Letter" Doctrine

In 1952 the executive branch made an affirmative policy statement
concerning sovereign immunity which was unconnected with a pending case.
The Acting Legal Advisor to the Department, Mr. Jack B. Tate, sent a letter to
the Acting Attorney General in May of that year.'3 In announcing what has
been termed the "Tate Letter" doctrine, the Department of State referred to the
distinction between acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis. On the basis of case
studies and the opinions of writers and commentators, the Department asserted
that the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity ought to be applied; thus,
sovereign immunity would be appropriate only in cases involving public acts
'3See. e.g., Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves His Day in Court, 67 HARv. L.
REv. 608 (1954); Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions. 40 AM. J. INT'L
L. 168 (1946); Timberg, Sovereign Immunity. State-Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception. 56
Nw. U.L. REV. 109 (1961).
31
1 1n distinguishing state trading from private trading, one commentator has stated:
State trading is by no means crystal-clear in conception and its ambiguity in operation is
even more pronounced. The commonly used technical definition of state trading is trade
which is conducted by a government or its agents. . . . In order unmistakably to
distinguish state from private trading, a dividing line may be drawn by specifying that
state trading exists when the government, in addition to determining the kind and
quantity of goods traded and their geographic distribution, also negotiates with regard to
prices and the terms of the transaction ...
Since state-trading is national in character, it is only natural that it is a basic
instrument of economic warfare.
Allen, State Trading and Economic Warfare, 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 256, 257-59 (1959).
1u26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
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(acts jure imperii) of a sovereign. The impetus to reject the traditional rule of
absolute immunity came primarily from changing politico-economic systems
and the need of private merchants engaging in trade with foreign sovereigns to
have disputes determined in courts of law. Coming on the heels of a judicial
determination that executive suggestions of immunity should be accorded
conclusive effect,133 this letter can perhaps be interpreted as an attempt by the
executive branch to permit the judiciary to make decisions on its own. Its
ultimate effect, however, would seem to be that of thwarting such judicial
freedom, especially in view of the manner in which the Department approached
the question of sovereign immunity in subsequent cases.
One paragraph of the letter, relating to executive policy and its weight in a
court of law, has engendered confusion:
It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts
but it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity
where the executive has declined to do so. There have been indications that at
least some Justices of the Supreme Court feel that in this matter courts should
follow the branch of the Government charged with responsibility for the
conduct of foreign relations.1*
This paragraph could be interpreted as a repudiation of the majority's
proposition in Hoffman that, in effect, the executive branch can control court
decisions on the question of sovereign immunity. Such a construction, implying
that courts are free to disregard Department suggestions, would suggest that
Berizzi Bros. is not as dead as some had thought and would also challenge the
holdings in The Navemar and Peru. On its face, this paragraph would seem at
least to imply, if it does not clearly state, that courts are free to make their own
determination and that an immunity suggestion cannot control their actions.
The treatment of subsequent cases, however, has indicated that perhaps the
executive branch did not intend to make such broad changes in the procedural
aspect of the doctrine.
The letter stated that the results of a survey of international opinion and
practice concerning sovereign immunity showed that only the Soviet Union and
its satellites continued to support full acceptance of the absolute rule of
sovereign immunity.'3 With regard to the economic motives favoring absolute
immunity, the "Tate Letter" declared that "Ithe reasons which obviously
motivate state trading countries in adhering to the theory [of absolute
immunity] with perhaps increasing rigidity are most persuasive that the United
States should change its policy."' 3' Of paramount concern to the Department,
'3Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
1"26 DEP'T STATE BULL. at 985 (1952).
'1 id.
13/1d. Other considerations which entered into the Department's decision to adopt the restrictive
approach included: (I) the realization that the granting of immunity to foreign governments in
American courts is inconsistent with actions of the United States government in subjecting itself to
suits in these same courts; (2) the further inconsistency with United States Government policy of not
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therefore, was the international economic structure which prevailed after World
War 11. According to the Department's analysis, the Soviet bloc, in employing
state-trading controls, would favor absolute inmunity. On the other hand, the
United States would prefer a restrictive approach to sovereign immunity in
order to encourage as much free trade as could effectively compete in a world
that was beginning to feel the effects of state-trading policies. 37
Taking the opinions in The Navemar, Exparte Peru and Hoffman together
with the Department's 1952 pronouncement, it might be adduced that the latter
statement would automatically bind the courts in subsequent cases, or until
such time as the Department should choose to express a different policy. The
"Tate Letter" doctrine was given recognition in New York and Cuba Mail
Steam Ship Company v. Republic of Korea.M There an in personam action
growing out of a collision with plaintiffs ship was initiated by attachment of
the defendant-government's funds in New York banks. The Secretary of State
asked the Justice Department to file a suggestion which asserted: "The
Department of State, however, has not requested that an appropriate suggestion
of immunity be filed, inasmuch as the particular acts out of which the cause of
action arose are not shown to be of purely governmental character." 13' Judge
Weinfeld, speaking for the district court, recognized that a request for immunity
presents a political rather than a judicial question. The court declared:
[lI]t has long been established that the Court's proper function is to enforce the
political decisions of our Department of State on such matters. This course
entails no abrogation of judicial power; it is a self-imposed restraint to avoid
embarrassment of the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs. I
Thus the court found itself bound to disallow the jurisdictional immunity
claim,' 4 1 even though the cargo of rice had been acquired by the Republic of
claiming immunity for its merchant vessels in foreign jurisdictions; and, (3) increasing practice, on
the part of all governments, of engaging in commercial activities, thus making necessary rules which
enable parties to have their rights determined in court. Id.
'1With regard to what has been referred to as the "new Soviet offensive," in 1957, Soviet Premier
Khrushchev said:
We declare war upon you-excuse me for using such an expression-in the peaceful field
of trade. We declare a war we will win over the United States. The threat to the United
States is not the ICBM, but is the field of peaceful production. We are relentless in this
and it will prove the superiority of our system.
State Dep't Press Release no. 30, Jan. 24, 1958 at 1-2. See Fensterwald, United States Policies
Toward State Trading, 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 369, 382 (1959), for further discussion of
American policy in light of such state trading activities as those employed by the Soviet Union.
13132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
11id. at 685.
"id. at 686 (footnote omitted).
1id. at 687. However, jurisdiction here rested on the writ of attachment. In the same letter in
which the Secretary of State requested that no suggestion of immunity be filed, due to the absence of
acts "of purely governmental character," immunity from attachment and seizure was recognized:
The letter from the Secretary of State of the United States to the Attorney General of the
United States recognizes that under international law property of a foreign government is
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Korea for free distribution to civilian and military forces in that country during
the Korean conflict. Such factual allegations, if proved, would seem to have
demanded immunity on the basis of past policy.
D.

Recent Practice-ExecutivePrimacy

That same year, 1955, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in National
4 2
City Bank v. Republic of China."
There the foreign sovereign brought suit
immune from attachment and seizure, and that the principle is not affected by a letter
dated May 19, 1952. . . .The Department of State accordingly has requested. . that
the Court be informed of the Department of State's agreement with the contention of the
Ambassador that property of the Republic of Korea is not subject to attachment in the
United States.
Id. at 685. The court commented that "by its own interpretation of its liberal policy against
unrestricted immunity, the Department of State declares in unmistakable language that it adheres
to the doctrine that the property of a foreign government is immune from attachment." Id. at 686.
In a footnote the court recognized the argument that the restrictive theory is illusory since in many
cases jurisdiction can only be acquired by attachment. The footnote continued:
Whether in the light of the relaxation of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity a
distinction should now be made between seizure of property . . .under execution to
enforce collection of a judgment, where jurisdiction has been previously acquired without
attachment or seizure, need not be decided at this time. A distinction might be urged on
the ground that in the instance where attachment is necessary to vest jurisdiction, the
basic issues are still unresolved, whereas in the instance of jurisdiction already acquired
the Court has passed on all issues including whether or not the claim rests upon acts of a
private rather than a public character.
Id. at 687, n.7. The motion to vacate the attachment was therefore granted by the court. Cf Loomis
v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied. 359 U.S. 928 (1959) (deemed to be an
established rule of international law that a sovereign is immune from legal process).
The view expressed in the above letter of the Secretary of State was further modified in a letter
submitted by the Attorney General for the Department in the 1959 case of Weilamann &
McCloskey v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959) where
the court stated that the Department has always recognized the distinction between "immunity
from jurisdiction" and "immunity from execution." The Department has maintained the view that
under international law property of a foreign sovereign is immune from execution to ratify even a
judgment obtained in an action against a foreign sovereign where there is no immunity from suit. Id.
at 472-73. After noting Dexter and Carpenter Inc. v. Kunglig Jurnvagsstyrelson, 43 F.2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931), where the court did not permit execution in a
proceeding in which the foreign sovereign had consented to suit, the court stated further that the
Department was of the further view that even when the attachment of the property of a foreign
sovereign is not prohibited for the purpose of jurisdiction, nevertheless the property so attached and
levied upon cannot be retained to satisfy the suit's judgment. The reason given was that in the Department's view, under international law the property of a foreign sovereign is immune from execution even in a case where the foreign sovereign is not immune from suit.
It is argued that since the court has the power to establish policy to some extent, it should do so in
the case of immunity from execution. Thus, if a court does not recognize sovereign immunity as a
defense, why should there be any bar to execution? As to the argument based on the coextensive
nature of jurisdiction and execution, see Comment, Judicial Adoption of Restrictive Immunity for
Foreign Sovereigns, 51 VA. L. REv. 316 (1%5). To the effect that courts should broadly apply
waiver of immunity and allow execution in all cases, see Note, Sovereign Immunity-Waiver and
Execution: Arguments From Continental Jurisprudence, 74 YALE L.J. 887 (1965).
1-348 U.S. 356 (1955).
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against the National City Bank to recover money deposited with the bank in
1948 by an official agency of the Republic of China. The defendant-bank's
counterclaim on treasury notes issued by the Republic had been dismissed by
the district court since it was not based on the same subject matter."3 Writing
for the majority, Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented initially: "The status of
the Republic of China in our courts is a matter for determination by the Executive and is outside the competence of this Court."'" The Court referred to the
pronouncement of the State Department against recognizing immunity for the
commercial operations of a sovereign, and noted that in Berizzi Bros. "this
Court thirty years earlier rejected the weighty opinion of Judge Mack in The
Pesaro .. . for differentiating between commercial and war vessels of
governments."'" In this case there was no attempt to bring a foreign defendant
into an American court of law; rather it was the foreign sovereign which initially
invoked the jurisdiction of the Court and which subsequently claimed immunity
from jurisdiction with regard to a counterclaim. The Supreme Court declared
that a counterclaim based on the same subject matter is a permitted
encroachment upon the immunity doctrine, but that there is great diversity
among the courts as to when a claim is "based on the subject matter of the
suit." " Admitting that fiscal management is one of those immune operations
of a foreign sovereign, as defined in the "Tate Letter," the Court found that
such distinction becomes irrelevant when the sovereign is a suitor in American
judicial proceedings. Of importance to the Court was the fact that the State
Department had not intimated even slightly that to allow the counterclaim
would embarass the United States in its relations with China."' The Supreme
Court thus reversed the lower court's dismissal of the defendant-bank's
counterclaim against the Republic of China.'" However, both the nature of the
case, and the fact that Mr. Justice Frankfurter made no positive statement
IORepublic of China v. National City Bank, 108 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd. 208 F.2d
627 (2d Cir. 1953), rev'd. 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
1"348 U.S. at 358.
'Id.at 361 (citations omitted).
"'Id. at 364.
"'Compare the Court's reasoning on this point with the analysis in Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman discussed in text accompanying note 113 supra.
10348 U.S. at 366. The Supreme Court was quick to indicate, however, that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is not a constitutional mandate, but rests on considerations of policy to which
the Court has given legal sanction. Id. at 358-59.
Mr. Justice Reed, joined by Justices Burton and Clark, dissented on the proposition that the
foreign sovereign would have been exempt from any direct suit on the notes. In his opinion, Mr.
Justice Reed said:
Deposits may be the lifeblood necessary for national existence. It is not wise for us to tell
the nations of the world that any assets they may have in the United States, now or in the
future, upon which suit must be brought, are subject to every counterclaim their debtors
can acquire against them at par or at a discount. It is unfair to our foreign friends and
detrimental to our own financial and mercantile inerests.
Id. at 372.
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expressing Supreme Court adoption of any particular definitional rule, militate
against the proposition that this decision stands for any precise set of guidelines
to be used by the lower courts.
For the most part, the political and economic trends which began in the
late forties and early fifties continued during the sixties. The postwar discord
between the United States and the Soviet Union had gradually expanded into a
cold war existence which involved complex governmental structures. The
Common Market proved to be so successful in lowering trade barriers between
the signatories that Congress enacted the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.119 The
purpose of the Act was to enable the United States to establish the same sort of
ecv.nui,.:c alliance and was to be effected by allowing the President to lower
tariffs on certain goods. The period after World War I I has been referred to as
the first era of truly global foreign policy.'" This is so because each major state
can apply its power to produce consequences in every part of the globe; further,
the number of participants in the international scene has nearly doubled since
1945.151 Postwar foreign policy has provided for the encouragement of Ameri-

can investment abroad by instituting risk-guaranty programs.152 United States
foreign policy has been necessarily dynamic, and international relations have
been necessarily expansive. In fact it has been suggested that foreign policy has
become "intercontinental policy."
In a 1961 district court decision, Rich v. Naviera Vacuba,1u the court
accepted without further inquiry the certificate and grant of immunity
issued by the State Department. Affirming on appeal, the Fourth Circuit
commented upon the executive suggestion: "We think that the doctrine of the
separation of powers under our Constitution requires us to assume that all
pertinent considerations have been taken into account by the Secretary of State
in reaching his conclusion."' I In the absence of Department action in the
141l9 U.S.C. § 1801 (1964).

'"Kissinger, Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy, in CONDITIONS

OF WORLD ORDER

164, 167

(Hoffman ed. 1968).
5id.
132An example of such governmental effort includes the Investment Guaranty Program initiated
by the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 144 (1948).
1uK. LONDON. THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY 13 (1964).
1197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). In this case the
vessel Bahia de Nipe had sailed from Cuba carrying a cargo of sugar to a Russian port. Three
hundred miles east of Bermuda, the master and ten crewmen assumed control and turned toward
Virginia, notifying the United States Coast Guard that they intended to seek asylum in the United
States. Three successive libels were filed: by longshoremen who had previously recovered judgments
against the foreign sovereign and the vessel, by Mayan Lines, S.A. which had recovered a consent
judgment in a state court and by a company that claimed the cargo had been expropriated by the
revolutionary government in Cuba.
1295 F.2d at 26; cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). In Marbury Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall declared that the power over foreign affairs power vested in the executive branch
was beyond judicial inquiry. He stated that "Ithe subjects are political. They respect the nation, not
individual rights, and being intrusted to the executive the decision of the executive is conclusive." Id.
at 166.

1970]

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

matter, the court stated that it could properly have considered the contention
raised by the libellant as to the effect of a waiver of immunity; but in suggesting
immunity the Department was deemed to have contemplated and rejected this
argument. 15' This approach may be considered an acceptance of that
construction of the "Tate Letter," one paragraph notwithstanding, which
declares that the judiciary is bound by the Department's determination since it
prxceeds directly from the preeminence of the executive branch in matters of
foreign affairs. Two of the claimants argued that the Department's suggestion
of immunity had been issued in violation of the "Tate Letter" doctrine. In
response the Solicitor General filed a Memorandum for the United&States in
which he proscribed the role of the State Department in light of that 1952
pronouncement:
That letter does set forth the considerations which the Department will take
into account in determining whether or not to recognize a claim of immunity
by a foreign sovereign. But it is wholly and solely a guide to the State
Department's own policy, not the declarationof a rule of law or even of an
unalterablepolicy position; and, in addition, it sets forth only some of the

governing considerations and does not purport to be all-inclusive or exclusive.
Here, the State Department has, in fact, recognized Cuba's claim to immunity,
after taking into account all pertinent factors. 5 7
It should be noted that the vessel in this case was performing a totally
commercial act; and yet the State Department, possibly influenced by thenexisting strained international relations, accorded at least substantial dignity in
1961 to the immunity request of Castro's Cuba.'"
One of the libellants showed that in a prior state court action, in which judgment against the
Republic of Cuba had been entered, the defendant had waived its immunity with respect to both
jurisdiction and execution. Thus it was argued that it was unconscionable for Cuba to later
repudiate that waiver and to request the State Department to submit a suggestion of immunity.
Another libellant asserted that, since the sugar cargo had belonged to it before being expropriated
from the company's plants in Cuba, release of the cargo under the Department's suggestion would
deprive it of property without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. To these
contentions the court answered: "Refusal of the State Department in these circumstances to enforce
Cuba's earlier waiver over its present assertion of immunity is within the Department's authority
and constitutes no violation of the libellant's rights under the Fifth Amendment." 295 F.2d at 26.
" Memorandum for the United States in Opposition [to Application for Stay Filed by James
Rich and Walter Precha] in I INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 276, 288 (1962) (emphasis added).
'Tlhat such dignity was accorded may be explained by a consideration of prevailing foreign
policy notions. Cuba had just agreed to release a hijacked United States airplane after the American government agreed to grant similar treatment to Cuban property. 48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 407
(1961).
In a 1964 case the Supreme Court held that Cuban confiscation of property owned by American
citizens had created valid title by virtue of the Act of State Doctrine. Banco National de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). It has been said, however, that denial by the government of Cuba
of fundamental rights to the Cuban people might well have raised the question whether the act of the
Cuban government should be taken as the act of the Cuban people. C. FENWICK, supra note 30, at
25. Fenwick discusses the effect which a breaking off of relations with a foreign government can
have upon judicial decisions. Fenwick further notes that the Sabbatino case has been widely
criticized by jurists. id. at 26 &n.7.
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It was not until 1964 that the restrictive theory enunciated in the "Tate
Letter" acquired concrete guidelines. In the case of Victory Transport Inc. v.
Comisaria General de A basterimientosy Transportes,13'decided by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, the appellee instituted proceedings under the United
States Arbitration Act. A branch of the Spanish Ministry of Commerce had
chartered the S.S. Hudson from its owner, the appellee, to transport a cargo of
wheat from Alabama to a Spanish port. The action was initiated when
appellant failed to pay for damages, allegedly due to an unsafe port, and refused
to submit the dispute to arbitration. After a brief review of the development of
the sovereign immunity doctrine, from its origin in an era in which kings could
do no wrong to the growing concern of some modern writers who question the
validity of absolute immunity, the court reinterated the policy statement in the
"Tate Letter." As to the oft-proclaimed rationale behind the substantive
approach of absolute immunity, the court said that "[]t makes no sense for the
courts to deny a litigant his day in court and to permit the disregard of legal
obligations to avoid embarrassing the State Department if that agency
indicated it will not be embarrassed."'' Recognizing that an immunity claim
could be presented properly in two ways," 2 the court stated that in this case no
suggestion had been received from the State Department. It thus became the
task of the court to decide for itself "whether it is the established policy of the
State Department to recognize claims of immunity of this type."' "
The Second Circuit lamented that the "Tate Letter" offered no precise
guidelines for differentiating between public and private acts. The court
recognized that in making the distinction some courts had looked to the nature
of the transaction, while others had looked to its purpose, and that both criteria
had been found to be unsatisfactory by the commentators. The Second Circuit
considered as significant the Department's failure or refusal to suggest
immunity, and thus felt disposed to deny an immunity claim not "recognized
and allowed" by the Department unless the activity plainly fell within one of the
categories of strictly political or public acts. According to the Victory
Transport court, such acts should generally be limited to the following
categories: (1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien, (2)
legislative acts, such as nationalization, (3) acts concerning the armed forces,
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity and (5) public loans.'" The court further
'1-336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
'9 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
"'336 F.2d at 358.
"1d. The following phraseology was employed to explain the acceptable procedure:
The foreign sovereign may request its claim of immunity be recognized by the State
Department, which will normally present its suggestion to the court through the Attorney
General or some law officer acting under his directions. Alternatively, the accredited and
recognized representative of the foreign sovereign may present the claim of sovereign
immunity directly to the court.
Id.
101d. at 359.
'Ild.
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advised that if the executive branch thinks these guidelines too limited in certain
cases, it could act affirmatively and file a suggestion of immunity. This advice
would seem to be in keeping with Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
in Hoffman, in which he noted that responsibility for the conduct of foreign
relations should be placed where the power lies-the executive branch-and that
the courts should be permitted to enforce the regular judicial processes.'"
Looking to the facts in Victory Transport, the Second Circuit found the
activity to be more private or commercial than public. The inclusion of an
arbitation clause in the contract was of particular significance in this decision.'"
The court also noted that maritime transport action had been included among
those commercial activities specifically mentioned in recent American treaties
restricting sovereign immunity.'6 Since the appellant did not claim that the
cargo of wheat was destined for the public services of Spain, the court presumed
that the wheat would be resold to Spanish nationals; whether the Spanish
Ministry lost money or made a profit was deemed irrelevant in making the
determination. The Second Circuit found support for its decision in the
Republic of Korea case where the free distribution of a cargo of rice during the
Korean War was found to be an act jure gestionis: "If the wartime
transportation of rice to civilian and military personnel is not an act jure
imperii, a fortiorari the peacetime transportation of wheat for presumptive
resale is not an act jure imperii."'" Thus, the court retained in personam
jurisdiction to enter the order below compelling arbitration.'"
In a case decided shortly thereafter, PetrolShipping Corp. v. The Kingdom
of Greece, 170 the Second Circuit held its Victory Transport decision to be
' 5Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 42 (1945) (concurring opinion).
"'The court quoted from a 1957 decision by a French court:
A contract relating to maritime transport is a private contract where the owner merely
puts his ship and the ship's crew at the disposal of the State and does not take a direct
part in the performance of the public service undertaken by the State in the latter's
capacity as a charterer. . . . The insertion of the arbitration clause underlies the
intention of the parties to make their agreement subject to private law.
336 F.2d at 361, quoting from Myrtoon S.S. Co. v. Agent Judicaire Du Tresor, 24 Int'l L. Rep.
205, 206 (1957).
"'A typical provision in a United States treaty with Israel was cited as an example. 336 F.2d at
361 n.15. The court noted that the 1926 Brussels Convention was the first major international
attempt to restrict sovereign immunity; that agreement, signed but never ratified by Spain, denied
immunity to all maritime governmental activity, except vessels exclusively in noncommercial
services. Id. at 361.
lid. at 362 (footnote omitted).
"'The Second Circuit stated that by agreeing to arbitrate in New York, where the United States
Arbitration Act made such agreements specifically enforceable, the Comisaria General was deemed
to have consented to the jurisdiction of that court which could compel the arbitration proceeding.
Cf Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 291 F. Supp. 225, 234
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 408 F.2d 606 (1969) (agreement to arbitrate was likewise held to constitute
submission to jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act).
'7360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966). The ultimate disposition of this case
climaxed a very interesting series of appeals, rehearings, and remands. After Petrol petitioned for an
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controlling. Petrol, owner of the tanker Atlantis, sought to compel the foreign
sovereign to proceed to arbitration pursuant to the terms of a commercial
agreement. Petrol had agreed in the charter party to transport grain acquired
under an agreement between the United States and Greek governments to a port
in Greece. The Kingdom of Greece disclaimed responsibility for damage to the
vessel which allegedly occurred due to an unsafe berth in the Greek port, and
thereafter would not agree to arbitrate the dispute. In the final disposition of the
case, the Second Circuit quoted in part from an amicus curiae brief submitted
by the Justice Department in the rehearing en banc:
Only after .

.

. jurisdiction is acquired does the sovereign immunity defense

property [sic] come into consideration. Instead of being a "jurisdictional"
matter in the same sense as acquiring jurisdiction over a person or property,
sovereign immunity presents a ground for relinquishing the jurisdiction
properly acquired."'

After satisfying itself that the requirements for jurisdiction were satisfied by
virtue of the arbitration clause and service of process, the court disposed of the
sovereign immunity claim very simply. On the question of immunity there was
only one point of distinction between the instant situation and that in Victory
Transport. In that prior case no executive advice had been given to the court
whereas in the instant case the United States Department of State, in a letter to
the Greek Ambassador, had declined to recognize and allow the claim of
immunity on the ground that the matter was jure gestionis. 7 Thus, relying on
order to compel arbitration, Greece submitted a claim of immunity directly to the district court.
The immunity claim was upheld and the petition to compel arbitration was denied. On appeal, the
denial of the petition was affirmed by a panel of the Second Circuit. Petrol Shipping Corp. v. The
Kingdom of Greece, 326 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), vacated. 332 F.2d 370 (1964). Judge Clark, dissenting
from that decision, suggested that the matter should be remanded and the position of the State
Department ascertained. Id. at 118 (dissenting opinion). On a rehearing en banc, the Department of
Justice submitted an amicus curiae brief which asserted that sovereign immunity does not present a
jurisdictional defect in the same sense that other inadequacies might, but rather that it is a ground
upon which jurisdiction may be properly relinquished. Petrol Shipping Corp. v. The Kingdom of
Greece, 332 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1964). The matter was then remanded to the district court for further
development of the facts. Before the court heard the case on remand, a panel of the Second Circuit
handed down the Victory Transport decision. On remand the district court then refused to accept
the plea of immunity, relying on Victory Transport, and ordered the parties to proceed to
arbitration. On reappeal, this time by the sovereign, the dismissal of the sovereign's immunity claim
was affirmed. Petrol Shipping Corp. v. The Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966).
171360 F.2d at 106.
172n PetrolShipping the parties entered into a stipulation in lieu of a hearing, and introduced the
charter party and documents of correspondence with the State Department. These documents
included the Greek Ambassador's request to the Department for recognition of the immunity claim,
petitioner's request for the Department to decline that ambassador's request, the reply to the foreign
ambassador in which the Department declined to recognize the sovereign immunity claim on the
ground that the matter was jure gestionis, and the reply to petitioner to the effect that the
Department had declined to intervene.
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its decision in Victory 7Transport,
the Second Circuit affirmed the district
3
court's order to arbitrate.
In both the Petrol Shipping and Victory Transport cases the plaintiffs were
able to satisfy the jurisdictional requisites by including in the commercial
agreements a clause which provided for arbitration in New York and by
thereafter instituting actions under the United States Arbitration Act. This
technique, employed in later cases, was an effort to avoid a problem which
had not presented itself in many prior factual situations. Jurisdiction was
easily acquired in most Nineteenth Century cases by simply attaching the
property of the foreign sovereign-defendant, as in the case of a vessel which
enters an American port. However, in cases like Petrol Shipping, for example,
the plaintiff was unable to effect attachment of the sovereign's property, and in
personam jurisdiction was acquired by means of the arbitration clause and an
order to compel arbitration. Thus, due to the impossibility of effecting in rem
jurisdiction, businessmen sought to protect themselves from the jurisdictional
inability to settle disputes in courts of law by bargaining for arbitration clauses
in commercial contracts.
The majority and dissenting opinions in the 1966 case of Chemical Natural
Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela'17 together provide an interesting
judicial examination of the present status of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Plaintiffs, a Delaware corporation and its subsidiary, entered into contracts
with a department of the Venezuelan government under which they agreed to
construct facilities for converting steam into electrical power which would then
be resold to the defendant-sovereign. The Republic of Venezuela subsequently
cancelled the contract and confiscated plaintiff's property, including the
mineral rights in a Venezuelan municipality. The plaintiffs commenced an
action of assumpsit by filing a writ of foreign attachment against a vessel in the
port of Philadelphia alleged to be the property of the Republic of Venezuela. At
the request of the defendant-sovereign the United States Department of State,
acting through the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, filed a suggestion of immunity which included a prayer to the
court to dismiss the action. 75 When the lower court entered an order overruling
its motion to dismiss, the foreign sovereign appealed to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania to challenge the jurisdiction of the lower court and to petition for
mandamus and for a writ of prohibition. At the outset the court declared that
the challenge to the lower court's jurisdiction could not be sustained since,
irrespective of whether sovereign immunity is a defense, that court had
jurisdiction of the cause of action by virtue of its jurisdiction over and power to
inquire into actions of trespass. The court stated that "Sovereign Immunity is
1"360 F.2d at I l1.
17420

Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1967).

"'The State Department has been criticized in this case for recommending immunity without

stating its reasons and without indicating whether the determination groceeded upon a "legal" or
more subtle political basis. See Note, Sovereign Immunity. 8 HARV. INT'L L.J. 388 (1967).
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in the nature of an affirmative defense; (a) it does not go to jurisdiction and (b)
it can be waived."'' Referring to the sovereign immunity doctrine as a "widely
accepted national and international diplomatic policy," the court set forth its
opinion of the present status of that rule as follows:
In order to preserve this policy of Sovereign Immunity from conflict,
confusion, and erosion, and to prevent a breach of friendly relations or a
severance of diplomatic relations or a possible war with a foreign nation, the
Supreme Court of the United States has held that in the realm of Foreign
Relations or Foreign Affairs, a determinationof Sovereign Immunity by the
Executive Branch of our Government, namely, the State Department, when

conveyed to a court through proper channels or officials, is-in the absence of
waiver or consent--binding and conclusive upon all our Courts.

.

. no matter

how unwise or, in a particular case how unfair or unjust the Department's
determination appears to be (a) to injured American citizens and (b) to vast
numbers of the American people and (c) to our Courts ... 17
In dismissing the complaint the court noted the "cannot control the courts"
language in the "Tate Letter," but then declared that irrespective of its clear
meaning the Department had silently abandoned that revised policy and had
apparently instituted instead a case by case immunity policy.7 8 The majority
opinion therefore concluded that: (1) the question of whether sovereign
immunity should be granted is a matter for determination in the first instance
by the executive branch, namely, the State Department; (2) such determination
would depend in each case upon (a) the foreign and diplomatic relations existing
at the time between the United States and the particular foreign sovereign, and
(b) the best interests of the United States at the particular time; and (3) if and
when the Department's determination is made and properly presented to the
court, that decision is binding upon the court.' 7'
In his dissenting opinion, after commenting upon the nature of the acts which
gave rise to the cause of action, Judge Musmanno characterized Venezuela's
subsequent request for sovereign immunity as an "effrontery as bold as its order
of confiscation," ' 8 amounting to a flagrant violation of the property rights of
American citizens who had been urged to invest in Latin America in the interest
of the Good Neighbor Policy. Musmanno said that although the majority had
declared itself helpless in light of the executive opinion, the Department, which
they seemed to consider infallible, had specifically denied infallibility in the
'1420 Pa. at 143, 215 A.2d at 867.
'"id. at 147, 215 A.2d at 869.
178id. at 159, 215 A.2d at 875-76.
'"Id. The court indicated that in reaching its conclusion it had relied heavily upon the
interpretation given the "Tate Letter" doctrine by the decisions in Stone Engineering Co. v.
Petroleos Mexicanos, 352 Pa. 12, 42 A.2d 57 (1945), Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324, U.S. 30
(1945), Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943), and the opinion submitted by the Solicitor General in
Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
1"420 Pa. at 173, 215 A.2d at 883.
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"Tate Letter." Judge Musmanno stated rather emphatically that "to the extent
that sovereign immunity exists, it is a creature of the Courts, not the Executive
Department of our government. And what the Courts have created they can
take away.""' Thus, he considered the opinion of the court to be based on an
erroneous concept of law: that once the Department suggests immunity the
courts are conclusively bound to adhere to such determination.1, Nor did he
consider Peru, Stone Engineering, or Rich to be controlling." s Judge
Musmanno then rendered an interesting summary of the historical preface to
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in which he stressed movement toward
greater governmental responsibility. He concluded by asserting his attitude with
respect to the realities of the immunity doctrine:
The sovereign immunity doctrine, with the exception clearly spelled out in
this opinion, is no longer a healthy manifestation of society. It is, in fact, an
excrescena of the body of the law, it encourages irresponsibility to world order,
it generates resentments and reprisals. Sovereign immunity is a stumbling
block in the path of good neighborly relations between nations, it is a sour note
in the symphony of international concord, it is a skeleton in the parliament of
progress, it encourages government toward chicanery, deception and
dishonesty. Sovereign immunity is a collosal effrontery, a brazen repudiation
of international moral principles, it is a shameless fraud.'"
In a more recent case considered twice by the courts, Pan American Tankers
Corporation v. Republic of Vietnam,lu the guidelines enunciated in Victory
"'Id. at 177, 215 A.2d at 885. Judge Musmanno pointed out that when the majority quoted the
decisions in Republic of China, they had overlooked the immediately following sentence which
stated that "[it [freedom of a foreign sovereign from being hauled into court] has become such
solely through adjudications of this Court." Id., quoting from National City Bank v. Republic of
China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1952).

'mJudge Musmanno stated that the Department had intervened and made its decision as to a legal

issue, not a political one. Further, he asserted that although the majority seemed to consider the
executive department as infallible, it refused to consider the legislative branch also infallible. 240
Pa. at 174, 215 A.2d at 883.

'The Peru case was deemed not controlling because the facts were wholly different. The decision
there was based on the seizure and detention of the ship. In Chemical Natural Resources, there was

no detention here and thus no consequent embarrassment to the United States; Peru also preceded
the "Tate Letter" doctrine. The Stone Engineering case was not considered pertinent by Judge and

Musmanno since it relied on Peru. and the executive opinion in that case was made with respect to
political matters while the instant case the opinion was based on legal matters. Rich was deemed not
to be controlling since in that case, which involved a detained vessel, the litigation was permitted to
go to judgment and the immunity question was raised only when execution was attempted. Id. at
182-85, 215 A.2d at 887-89.
' MId. at 194, 215 A.2d at 893.
11291 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rehearing 296 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Plaintiff owner
and operators of American flag vessels, had entered into a shipping contract with the Director of
Commercial Aid of the Ministry of the Economy of the Republic of Vietnam and two private
companies, Hatien Cement Plant and Vixico. The contract, which also included a clause providing

for arbitration in New York, called for plaintiffs to deliver cargoes of cement. When defendants
refused to allow plaintiffs to unload the cement and declined to arbitrate a dispute as to the terms of
the agreement, the plaintiffs initiated action to compel such arbitration.
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Transport were treated with approval. In the first Pan Am case,"'s which dealt
primarily with the proper procedural means of presenting an immunity
suggestion, the defendant-foreign sovereign appeared specially to oppose the
arbitration motion on grounds of sovereign immunity. Stating that it intended
to petition the State Department for an immunity suggestion, the Republic of
Vietnam requested that the motion be held in abeyance pending receipt of such
suggestion. On the other hand, the plaintiffs, owners and operators of three
American flag vessels, urged the court itself to request instruction from the
State Department. The district court declined to accept either of these
approaches. In refusing to hold the motion in abeyance, the court stated that
"there is no guarantee that the Department of State will make any suggestion in
this case, but may leave the matter completely to the Court-with the result of
nothing accomplished but harmful delay.""187 Since the issue had been presented
to the court in a proper manner-asserted by a claimant directly to the
court-the court felt it to be irrelevant that the foreign sovereign had expressed
an intention to proceed diplomatically as well. As to whether it should petition
the Department for a suggestion, the court said:
It would not be appropriate for the Court to take the initiative in such matters,
except when it invites the Government to act as amicus curiae and express its
position. The suggestion of the Department of State in these matters is far more
than an amicus brief; and (at least when representations have gone through
diplomatic channels) such a suggestion would apparently be conclusive upon
the courts. The Court, therefore, should not adopt a procedure that may
prejudice one side or the other in the presentation of its views.'"
Relying on the Petrol Shipping and Victory Transport cases, the court
concluded that it would be imprudent to decide the issue presented directly to
the court on the basis of the meager record. For example, there was no evidence
that the immunity plea had been entered by one who had the authority to act for
the Republic of Vietnam, or that the two corporate defendants were creatures of
that sovereign. The court was thus compelled to reserve decision on the motion
to compel arbitration pending determination of the immunity issue.I"
In 1969 the arbitration motion was again before the court. ', The defendantsovereign contended it was entitled to immunity since its role in the transaction
luld. at 49.
"'"d.
at 51.
"Id. (citations omitted). The court said that when the sovereign makes the suggestion directly to
the court it is in the nature of a defense, and the claimant has the burden of proving its privilege of
immunity. Perhaps this is one of the "different results flowing from the procedure employed by the
sovereign," to which the Government referred in its amicus brief in Petrol Shipping. Id. at 52. See
the discussion of Petrol Shipping, id. at 51-52.
"'The Pan A in court expressed its agreement with the Petrol Shipping statement that "sovereign
immunity is not a jurisdictional defect but rather a substantive defense like incapacity or
incompetency." Id. at 52.
'"Pan Am Tankers Corp. v. Republic of Vietnam, 296 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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was primarily that of governmental supervisor over the expenditure of foreign
exchange, a role which involved acts allegedly political in nature. Plaintiff
contended the involvement went beyond mere political acts into the realm of
commercial activity."' After reciting the guidelines set out in Victory
Transport, the court determined that the instant act was not one of foreign
exchange control, as urged by defendant, and therefore was not one of the
exempt transactions labelled by the court in Victory Transport as "an internal
administrative activity." The critical inquiry went to the character of the
conduct which generated the law suit. That is, plaintiffs did not complain of any
activity involving foreign exchange control; rather they sought to remedy an
alleged breach of a commercial contract which would be decided by the
arbitrator, should the motion issue." 2 The district court therefore declined to
accept the plea of sovereign immunity.'
"'Plaintiffs also contended "that the central focus of the [court's) inquiry must be the essential
nature of the transaction out of which the controversy arose, and that if it should turn out to be
commercial no immunity should be granted regardless of the extent of governmental involvement."
Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
'"Even in the absence of such a determination, the court asserted that the foreign sovereign would
fail to sustain the burden of proof. According to the court, the documentary evidence submitted
tended only to show an active participation in all aspects of the cement transaction. However, the
affidavit of Bui Diem, Vietnam Ambassador to the United States, denied that the Republic of
Vietnam was a contracting party and asserted the contentions later raised in court: that the sovereign acted only to control the expenditure of foreign exchange.
The court's disposition of the issue presented seems to be in accord with section 72 of the
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law. This section states the general rule in two
parts, basing the distinction on the manner in which the suggestion was made:
(I) Under the law of the United States, an objection based on the rule of immunity stated
in § 65, if made on behalf of a foreign state by means of a suggestion from the executive
branch of the government of the United States as indicated in § 711()(a), is conclusive as
to issues determined by executive action within the exclusive constitutional competence of
the executive branch of the government and as to other issues directly affecting the
conduct of foreign relations. As to all other issues, such a suggestion will be given great
weight.
(2) Under the law of the United States, an objection made by the government of a
foreign state through its accredited diplomatic representative as indicated in § 71(1 )(b)
raises an issue for disposition by the court or other enforcing agency upon the basis of
proof.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 72 (1961). The court, in the absence of a
suggestion of the kind referred to in section 71(a)(I), treated the suggestion filed directly in court as
raising an issue for disposition in due course. This required the foreign sovereign to carry the burden
of proof in order to effectively plead sovereign immunity as a defense. That burden had not, as yet,
been carried by the Republic of Vietnam.
Likewise, an illustration to section 72(2) cites The Navemar, where the court required the foreign
sovereign to prove the allegations in a suggestion submitted by its foreign Ambassador as a
claimant in court.
Section 72(l) would also seem to be in general accord with other recent decisions. See. e.g., Rich
v. Naviera Vacuba, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
'296 F. Supp. at 361. However, other allegations appearing in the documents submitted by the
defendent appeared to raise other defenses, e.g., there was a question as to whether the Republic of
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The restrictive approach to the substantive law of sovereign immunity was
again reaffirmed in-Amkor Corporationv. Bank of Korea.' "The fiscal arm of
the Korean government, the Bank of Korea, had solicited and accepted
plaintiffs bid for construction of a caustic soda plant to be built for a private
Korean corporation. The defendant was acting as an agent of the foreign
sovereign pursuant to a program of economic cooperation between the Korean
and United States governments. In its communication to the court the State
Department had asserted:
The essence of the transaction, as alleged, is a simple contract for purchase of
commercial articles on behalf of a commercial enterprise. The fact that the
Bank of Korea was acting pursuant to an agreement between the Government
of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Korea, or that it is
an official arm of the Republic of Korea, does not alter the commercial nature
of the transaction. The policy expressed in the Tate Letter focusses upon the
nature of the transaction and not upon the character of the government agency
involved or upon its reasons for engaging in a transaction.'"
The Department's refusal to suggest immunity was held to be binding and
therefore defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity
was denied.'"
After these recent cases it appears that the restrictive approach to the
question of sovereign immunity is entrenched. And yet one notable point of
confusion persists: when the immunity claim is asserted directly in court, or
when the executive branch is silent (as it was in the PanA m case), what shall the
courts look to in determining the question? Should the courts base their
opinions upon prior decisions in cases arising out of the same facts, or upon past
political pronouncements in similar situations? It cannot be said that the result
would be the same regardless of the approach chosen. Political developments,
such as wars or other military conflicts, or economic fluctuations, such as depressions, would necessarily cause past executive pronouncements to be varied
even when factual situations seem identical.
Vietnam had in fact accepted the "Arbitration Clause" as part of the contract. Therefore, the court
held its order in abeyance while directing the defendant to state all grounds for objection.
1"298 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
'Oid. at 144.
'"However, the court may have indicated that, in the absence of a statement by the Department, it
would have applied the restrictive theory and found a similar lack of immunity, when it said:
In any event, it is plain that the activities allegedly engaged in by defendant and giving
rise to this dispute are private and commercial in nature rather than public or political
acts and, therefore, applying the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, defendant is
not entitled to immunity here.
Id. Does this therefore mean that when the Department is silent the court will look to a purely
judicial interpretation of the question, devoid of past executive policy? Since the judicial approach
would seem to have been merged with the executive approach in the restrictive theory, perhaps the
question cannot, and need not, be answered.
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Ill.

CONCLUSION

Durilig the past two centuries the United States has changed from an
underdeveloped but emerging colonial state to a world leader. This dramatic
change has caused fluctuations and occasional reversals of government policy.U
The American legal system has experienced similar fluctuations. The ancient
doctrine of sovereign immunity, one facet of that system, has undergone a
metamorphosis which necessarily parallels that of evolving United States
foreign policy.
In general, foreign policy embodies and reflects those principles which have
arisen from a, nation's history, ideologies, power potential and cultural
predilections.'" International economics is a vital element of United States
foreign policy, however, and this must not be overlooked. '" Also, international
law has an impact upon foreign policy, for it is the general recognition of
reasonable rules of conduct that gives a desirable degree of certainty in foreign
affairs. International law is workable today only because governments are
willing to subordinate their sovereign rights to the rules and customs which
comprise international law.'" The application of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, one of the rules of international law, clearly influences the character
of relations among states as it involves the very essence of international
affairs-the extent to which a state will relinquish its sovereign rights in order to
permit the judicial process to operate.
A.

The Substantive Aspect of Sovereign Immunity

It is clear that the restrictive rule of sovereign immunity currently prevails in
the United States. The executive branch has recommended"' and the judiciary
'Wn discussing the character and scope of United States foreign policy, Charles Fenwick has
defined that concept as necessarily involving reorientation and change:
In a broad sense foreign policy may be defined tentatively as the attitude the United
States takes in its relations to and with other countries which it is believed will best assure
our national safety and promote our national welfare. How to keep our country secure;
how to protect our political, economic and social interests, and how to do so within the
traditions of moral idealism that have come down to us from the beginning of our
history,-a vast program, involving major and minor interests of the widest variety. A
policy suggests a certain consistency between what we are doing today and what we have
been doing in the past. But conditions change, and obviously the changes must be taken
into account when they are fundamental.
C. FENWICK, supra note 30, at I.
'"K. LONDON. supra note 153, at I.
'The difficulty in isolating economic policy has been recognized:
In diplomatic and legal questions the actors involved are obviously the states themselves,
but in international economic problems (unless these are a state monopoly as in Russia)
there are also individuals, and their interests and trade with one another across state
frontiers, who must be considered.
F. HARTMANN, supra note 8, at 131. It is apparent that the formulation of foreign policy notions,
for example mercantilism, is the product of both political and economic pressures.
mK. LONDON, supra note 153, at 7.
0'26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
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approved in applications" this more limited substantive approach. The standard
generally applied to determine if immunity should be granted under the
restrictive rule is whether the foreign sovereign has undertaken a governmental,
as opposed to a commercial, activity. The distinction has been expressed in
terms of public acts (acts jure imperii) and private acts (acts jure gestionis).2 In
order to differentiate between the two, some writers and courts have looked to
the "nature of the transactions,"2 while others have scrutinized the "purpose
of the transaction." 3 Whatever the criteria, the restrictive rule holds a foreign
sovereign accountable for his actions, unless overriding foreign policy
considerations exist. When compared with the older practice of absolute
immunity, the present rule appears to advance the concept of "justice," for the
private activities of all persons, sovereigns notwithstanding, are subject to
review in a public forum. 3 '
The most popular rationale for the immunity doctrine is that the notion of
comity between states requires that every nation accord due respect to all other
sovereigns. Since effective foreign policy depends upon harmonious
international relations, it may be argued that foreign affairs are less strained if
immunity is granted absolutely. The traditional rule of absolute immunity
provides that once a defendant establishes its sovereignty, regardless of the
circumstances, immunity is proper. On the other hand, a more limited rule is
entirely appropriate today. Contemporary rules of law recognize that if a
government acts in a non-governmental fashion, it should compensate damaged
individuals.
At the very root of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is an apparent conflict
between this proposition that one should be responsible for any damages one
causes, and the notion that all sovereigns are supreme. The traditional approach
generally decides the conflict in favor of the latter notion, whereas an approach
that would never allow immunity would not recognize such supremacy. The
contemporary restrictive approach seems to present a compromise between
'See, e.g.. Victory Transport v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d
354 (1964), cert. denied. 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
026 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
roUnder this approach, a public or governmental activity is defined as one which is not performed
by a private individual. At times use of this criterion has produced results criticized as inequitable.
See J. ALLEN. THE POSITION OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS (1933).
mUnder the "purpose of the transaction" approach immunity is proper only if the object of the
enterprise is public in nature; however, theoretically all sovereigns act only for a valid purpose. The
use of this approach has resulted in inconsistent decisions. In Victory Transport the Second Circuit
commented that "[functionally the criterion is purely arbitrary and necessarily involves the court
in projecting personal notions about the proper realm of state functioning." 336 F.2d at 359.
m
inthe case of Dexter &Carpenter, Inc. v. Kungleg Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931), the court did not permit execution of the judgment. Yet, even after such
refusal by the court, it is noted that in 1933 the Swedish government made settlement in the amount
of $150,000. 2 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 79, at 480. In light of this settlement can it he doubted
that the presentation of a dispute in a public forum, even where the resulting judgment cannot be
enforced, does not at least have some value?
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these two opposing ideas. Thus, just as the right to contract freely is limited by
certain countervailing rules, such as those against usury and unconscionability,
likewise the right to summon another into a public forum must be limited in
extreme situations. Further, the supremacy which all sovereigns enjoy must be
flexible if sovereigns are to deal with each other in a regulated manner. Foreign
relations are not harmed by the current rule of sovereign immunity if all nations
are willing to relinquish their sovereign rights under certain circumstances. The
present disposition of the substantive aspect of the doctrine clearly meets the
demands of an effective United States foreign policy which ultimately must
yield to the merits of compromise in certain situations.
Since international economics is an integral part of United States foreign
policy, the application of the sovereign immutity doctrine also has an effect
upon prevailing economic policy considerations. Contemporary American
governmental structures have granted due respect to international trade.2 The
Twentieth Century has witnessed a proliferation of state-trading practices with
the economic policy of the Soviet bloc being the most obvious example.
Conversely, the United States has continually sought to encourage free
enterprise in the international marketplace. Theoretically, limiting devices such
as tariffs, import duties, and quota systems are utilized only when necessary to
benefit the whole of the American economy.2m
The restrictive approach is practicable today because its effect is consonant
with both the conduct of foreign affairs and American trade policy. Neither a
grant nor denial of immunity under the restrictive approach should disrupt
prevailing American foreign relations or trade structures. It is not submitted
that the present substantive rule of sovereign immunity should be enshrined as a
steadfast rule. It is enough that it is workable today. If future United States
foreign policy should necessitate a change in the doctrine, even a return to
absolute immunity might be needed. Likewise, a movement toward absolute
non-immunity eventually might become appropriate.
B.

The Procedural Aspect of Sovereign Immunity

An equally important facet of the doctrine of immunity is the procedural
aspect-the formal means of presenting the defense of immunity to the courts.
0of practical concern to one seeking to engage in foreign trade is the ability to operate efficiently
and effectively within the framework of the American financial system. This framework includes the
Treasury, the Federal Reserve System and private commercial banks. In general, this is said to be a
free system in that it imposes few barriers to the international movement of funds. See D. WATSON,
EcONOMIC PoLIcY-BusNEss AND GOVERNMENT 702-13 (1960). It is also necessary to understand
the workings of a number of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund,
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Finance
Corporation. Id.
a"The present administration's response to Japanese textile makers, who glutted the domestic
textile market in early 1970, provides recent evidence that the United States government will engage
in protectionist practices when the inflow of foreign-produced goods tends to cause substantial
injury to domestic merchants. See BusiNESS WEEK, Mar. 4, 1970, at 117-18.
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It should be understood that a court which grants an immunity claim has initial
jurisdiction over the controversy; when the defense is recognized the court is said
to have relinquished that jurisdiction. The litigant may present a claim of
immunity in either of two ways: the foreign sovereign may appear as a claimant
and present the issue directly to the court, or the sovereign may request that the
United States Department of State file a suggestion of immunity with the court,
or it may do both. The courts accord the latter suggestion a conclusive effect,
under the rationale that the judiciary should not render a decision which could
prevent this executive branch from carrying out its foreign affairs duties. When
a sovereign presents a claim directly in court, a determination is rendered taking into account past decisions with similar factual situations.
As previously indicated, this responsibility for creating and effecting foreign
policy is not within the realm of the judiciary. Instead, the United States
Constitution has specifically delegated such responsibility to the executive and
legislative branches,m with the greatest power residing in the former. From the
specific grants of power to the President, other executive powers have been
derived. Thus, since the Executive may appoint ambassadors, he possesses the
power to pursue diplomatic relations with foreign states. By virtue of the
President's position as the head of a sovereign state, neither the principle of
"reserved rights," ' t ' nor the separation of powers may limit the executive
branch in its conduct of international relations."'
Although the doctrine of sovereign immunity is given judicial application and
is jurisprudential in theory, it is impossible to characterize as totally "legal"
any rule which has an impact upon diplomatic relations between states.212 To
disregard that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has an impact upon
diplomatic relations and therefore permit the responsibility for applying the
doctrine to rest in the hands of the judiciary is not wise. Such an approach
would leave the application of a vital instrument of foreign affairs to those who
have had little experience with sophisticated contemporary foreign policies .2 In
'U.S. CONSr. arts. i, Ii.
21id. amend. X.
21
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
2"However, it has been argued that the approach should be a totally legal one, rather than wholly
or even partially political. See. e.g., Comment, Restrictive Sovereign Immunity, the State
Department, and The Courts, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 397 (1967). There the writer states that the
disposition of the doctrine has been political for too long, and that the American development in this
area has been slow when compared with that of other international states. The writer would,
however, recognize situations in which it is imperative that even commercial activities of a foreign
sovereign be held immune; the circumstances of the Rich case were cited. Contrariwise, some
commentators have taken the totally political view, arguing that properly such decisions should be
made solely by the executive branch.
"Some commentators argue that in refusing to countermand an executive determination the
judiciary has abdicated its traditional and constitutional responsibility. See, e.g.. Cardozo, Judicial
Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogativeor Abdication to Usurper.
48 CORNELL L.Q. 461 (1963); Jessup, supra note 130. Conversely, they accuse the executive branch
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recent years the courts themselves have recognized the special expertise
possessed by the Department of State."'
During the 1940's the American judiciary expressed the need to clarify the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. In 1952 the executive branch responded with
the "Tate Letter 2 15 and more recently the courts have reciprocated by
proposing specific guidelines.'" The present procedural disposition of the
doctrine is more uniform and less uncertain than at any time since its
21
introduction in The Schooner Exchange. 1
If the sovereign appears directly to present its claim, or is pressed into this
alternative because the Department has declined to act, the burden of proving
immunity rests upon the claimant. Since sovereign immunity is a defense to be
pleaded and argued just as any other, the onus is upon the sovereign both to
allege and to prove such elements as are sufficient to take the situation within
the restrictive rule of substantive law.
Once the interrelationship between the executive and judicial branches is
recognized with respect to application of the doctrine, it follows that the
Department must be accorded wide discretion. The current disposition of the
procedural aspect of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is workable today. The
execution of foreign policy is not hampered but rather is facilitated if the
Department is permitted to act when compelling circumstances so dictate. It
may be argued that it is manifestly unconstitutional and artless to place a rule
of law in the hands of the executive branch. It is argued that whenever a court of
law is not permitted to d.cide an otherwise justiciable controversy, a manifest
21
injustice is done both to the instant claimant and to society in general.
Perhaps this "injustice" is a danger built into any rule of international law, a
danger which must persist until such time as there are no more "sovereigns,"
of usurping the judicial power. These critics contend that international relations will be strengthened
if courts refuse to grant immunity to foreign sovereigns and decide all controversies properly
presented. The proposition underlying their contentions is that the "rule of law" demands
enforcement if the concept of justice is to be effectuated.
2'It
is significant to note the important role which foreign affairs diplomacy has played in the last
two decades. International tensions have been high since the early fifties; a cold war existence has
been aggravated by subversive activities in developing states, military confrontations, the space
race, the missile crisis and international trade competition. See A. SAVE & M. POUND, PRINCIPLES
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 239 (1966). In dealing with these tensions there has been increased
movement in the direction of diplomatic initiative at the conference table. The diplomatic burden
falls upon the State Department since it is that executive department's duty to formulate and
execute foreign policy in its day to day operations. Id. at 306.
"'26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
2"See Victory Transport v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354,
360 (1964), cert. denied. 381 U.S. 934 (1965), which prescribed five types of activities which should
be considered governmental.
2l1 I U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
2"However, it is not at all apparent that the doctrine of sovereign immunity causes this to occur.
It can just as easily be asserted that the principle of separation of powers demands that the judiciary
refuse to indirectly regulate foreign affairs, an activity constitutionally reserved to other branches.
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and conflicting rules of international law are replaced by one system of laws for
all mankind."'
If the utility of executive opinion is to be maximized, immunity suggestions
must reflect even the slightest policy changes.m The executive branch must not
couch its opinions in language which is susceptible to more than one
construction. If policy reasons should demand that the Department suggest
absolute liability, as envisioned by at least one noted commentator,22 such a
determination probably would be binding and proper.
The interrelationship between the two branches when sovereign immunity
questions arise will be effective only if the Department makes such policy
changes known to the court. Likewise, if confusion should surround a particular
aspect of sovereign immunity, so that departmental policy aims are affected, it
is the duty of the State Department to issue an affirmative statement, as it did in
the "Tate Letter." If further definitional guidelines are required, the
Department should not hesitate to make positive recommendations.m
The substantive and procedural aspects of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
influence the execution of United States foreign policy. If the restrictive doctrine
is compatible with contemporary policy dictates in the foreign policy arena, one
may conclude that it is practicable and that in general, broad criticism of the
doctrine is unwarranted. Critical comment will become both appropriate and
necessary if some future application of the restrictive doctrine has a disruptive
effect upon United States foreign policy.
J.W.R.
21 See Note, supra note 141, where the writer suggests that the present solution is a relaxation of
the rules governing immunity.
"Flexibility and the capacity to reverse directions is imperative when dealing with an instrument
as delicate as American foreign policy. The executive branch must be cognizant of pressure applied
by democratic citizens as well as by foreign states. Three percent of the United States population is
Jewish, but politicians are aware of their pressure vis-a-vis the state of Israel. Every American
President has supported the sovereignty of Israel, despite adverse pressure such as lobbying by the
oil industry to encourage good relations with the Arab states. It is the pressure of this three percent
of the population which has caused some to wonder, "Isthere a Jewish Foreign Policy?" See TIE.
Mar. 16, 1970, at 15.

n'See note 79 supra.
'Recommendations were in fact solicited by the Second Circuit in Victory Transport. After
prescribing the five types of activities which it considered governmental or public, the court stated:
Should diplomacy require enlargement of these categories, the State Department can file
a suggestion of immunity with the court. Should diplomacy require contraction of these
categories, the State Department can issue a new or clarifying policy pronouncement.
336 F.2d at 360.

